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ABSTRACT 
GREAT CAPTAINS AND THE CHALLENGE OF SECOND ORDER 
TECHNOLOGY: OPERATIONAL STRATEGY AND THE MOTORISATION OF 
THE BRITISH ARMY BEFORE 1940 
by 
CHARLES J. FORRESTER 
No one worked harder on his own image than Bernard 
Montgomery, but he is rightly ranked among the most notable 
British Second World War commanders. Less well-known is 
Richard O'Connor, largely because of his own disregard 
for publicity. They were two very different types of 
personality. Both, however, demonstrated command skills 
and operational strategic insights which enabled them to 
compensate for the British Army's shortcomings in armour 
in 1940. They were able to use what they had - simple 
motorization - and adapt it away from stereotyped concepts 
of logistical employment, which they replaced with 
beneficial operational strategic utilization; Montgomery 
during the Flanders Campaign (1940) and O'Connor in his 
Libyan Campaign (1940-41). The two cases indicate that 
advantage in warfare does not merely rely on numbers or 
on superior or inferior armaments. It may have to rely 
as much - if not more - on the personalities of the 
commanders. 
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PREFACE 
In this account of some operational strategic effects 
of the motorization of the British Army before 1940 in 
the hands of two outstanding commanders, Bernard Montgomery 
and Richard O'Connor, it has seemed best to me to adhere 
to a number of principles in laying out the material. 
Firstly, abbreviations and acronyms are spelled-out where 
first encountered in the text. In the matter of foreign 
words in the text, these are not underlined if they appear 
unitalicized in the Oxford English Dictionary. With regard 
to technical terms, they are explained in the text where 
this is thought necessary. Regarding the styling of 
military ranks, styling in the text is according to the 
practice of the times; thus, for example, Lieutenant-
General, not Lieutenant General as today. Lastly, the 
text includes many direct quotations from written 
documentary material and interview tapes but obvious errors 
have been corrected and minor confusions clarified. 
I owe particular thanks to two people; to my supervisor, 
Professor Deon Fourie, for his unfailing kindness and 
support over the past number of years and to my brother, 
Dr. John Forrester, University of York, U.K., for his 
constant support and encouragement. 
Special thanks must go to several individuals who were 
very helpful to me during the course of my research: Lt. 
Col. Michael Young (Retd.), Editor, The Royal Logistic 
Corps Journal, R.L.C. Regimental Headquarters, Camberley, 
Surrey, U.K., for his helpful advice and encouragement; 
Major R.G. Mills, Regimental Area Secretary (Warwickshire), 
The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers, Warwick, U.K., for 
providing me with copies of articles written by Field-
Marshal Montgomery; Mr. T.F. Mackenzie, Keeper of 
Documentation and Information, South Lanarkshire Council, 
Hamilton, Fife, U.K., for providing me with important 
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material on General O'Connor; Mr. C.P. Atkins, Librarian, 
National Railway Museum, York, U.K., for arranging access 
for me to a wealth of material on railways and war; and 
Mr. Wally Dougan, Curator, Museum of Army Transport, 
Beverley, North Yorkshire, U.K., for facilitating a visit 
to the Museum. 
Many thanks also to the following: Ms. Mary-Lynn Suttie, 
Subject Librarian: Politics, History, Church History and 
Religious Studies, Unisa Library; Ms. Penny Bonning and 
Mr. Stephen Walton, Department of Documents, Ms. Rosemary 
Tudge, Department of Sound Records, and the staff of the 
Photograph Archive, Imperial War Museum, London; and Ms. 
Kate O'Brien and Ms. Victoria Holtby, Liddel Hart Centre 
for Military Archives, King's College, University of London. 
I also wish to thank Ken Startup, History Department, 
Williams Baptist College, Arkansas, U.S.A., for wishing 
my research well via the Internet. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND ITS SETTING 
1.1 The British Army's First Order Technological Deficit, 
1940 
Between the two world wars there was an expectation 
among some military writers and soldiers with a desire 
to modernize the British Army that armour should be 
developed so as to become the predominant arm of the Army. 
There was a wide divergence of views on the subject of 
Army modernization ~n the British Army in this period. 
What Luvaas, for instance, describes as: "that devoted 
band of tank enthusiasts who improvised, experimented, 
planned, exchanged views and information, and fought by 
whatever means available to overcome the Treasury, 
conservatism, and apathy in order to create the armoured 
force of their dreams" was, as Bond emphasises, never a 
num~rically large group. 1 In addition to J.F.C. Fuller 
and B.H. Liddell Hart, it included (as they afterwards 
became; at this time middle-ranking officers) 
Lieutenant-General Sir Charles Broad, Major-General Sir 
Percy Hobart, and Sir Fre~erick Pile. For Larson, the 
crucial fact to remember about Fuller and Liddell Hart's 
theory of armoured warfare is that it was far more than 
a new set of ideas formulated simply to maximize the 
capabilities of tanks, it was a comprehensive philosophy 
of war explicitly designed to destroy the theoretical and 
practical foundations of the strategy of attrition. 2 
However, there were several reasons why the British Army 
did not concentrate on establishing the armoured force 
for which these 'modernists' hoped. There was optimism 
that a new era of peace was possible, that there should 
1 
2 
be no more Passchendaeles. Amongst these reasons were 
failure to perceive the threat posed by the rise of 
totalitarian nationalism in Germany, fear that rearmament 
would initiate an arms race that could antagonise Germany 
into starting a war, the conservatism of dominant 
personalities in the War Office, and also competition with 
the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force for such limited funds 
as were available. Although there was more to failure 
to rearm than public 'mood', public opinion was in the 
main wedded to the ideal - illusion - of peace by 
disarmament. 3 Churchill's Chief of Staff in his capacity 
as minister of defence was General Sir Hastings Ismay. 
Though insufficient alone as a source, Ismay's description 
of the War Office in this period as: "hidebound, 
unimaginative, impersonal and over-populated", can be used 
as illustrative of the view that the War Office was 
unimaginative and indecisive. 4 In 1919 the Government 
instituted the 'Ten Year Rule' for defence spending, stating 
that: ''it should be assumed for framing revised estimates 
that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great 
war during the next ten years 11 • 5 Financial restrictions 
intensified a stagnation which affected the whole character 
and spirit of the Army. The British Army's failure to 
develop a settled, cohesive doctrine of mechanised, armoured 
warfare resulted in 1940 in a lack of armour capable of 
deep strategic penetration. Coupled to this were major 
shortcomings with respect to the firepower, protection, 
and mobility of many of the most important types of British 
tank until at least 1943. The failure to develop an 
adequate principal gun, the reluctance to move from rivetted 
to cast or welded construction, and the failure to develop 
a standard engine of sufficient power meant that Britain's 
principal gun-tanks - the tanks intended to actually engage 
and defeat enemy tanks - had significant shortcomings that 
emphasised the British Army's deficit in first order 
6 technology. 
However, there were improvements to 'motorized' means 
of movement and supply, and in the measure in which force 
could be moved and maintained in the inter-war period. 
3 
This meant that by 1940, the British Army was no longer 
dependent on horse transport. Bond comments: "it was ••• 
to the War Minister's [Hore-Belisha's] credit that a field 
force of five divisions was wholly motorized (i.e. not 
dependent on horse transport) and ready to be sent to France 
soon after the outbreak of war. 117 From the 1920s, there 
had been a concerted effort at the Royal Army Service Corps 
(R.A.S.C.) Mechanical Transport School, Aldershot to improve 
vehicle mobility and, by the early 1930s, specialized 
~ilitary off-road vehicles were emerging as a distinct 
group of designs. 8 This was unlike the German Army which, 
although it developed a modern tank force, entered the 
Second World War with a large proportion of its logistics 
and artillery still drawn by animals. In 1940 the bulk 
of the German Army was less motorized than many others; 
animal power being used by the Wehrmacht to move men, 
equipment, supplies, and artillery. Waffen-SS units were, 
however, fully motorized, and it is possible that the 
Wehrmacht's acceptance of the SS in a fighting role was 
due, to some extent, to its need of SS transport. For 
Van Creveld: "the army that was to shake the West was a 
scavenger. Its hopes for victory rested in part on the 
capture and utilization of French, Dutch and Belgian 
vehicles". 9 With reference to the history of Germany's 
tank force, General F.M. von Senger und Etterlin makes 
the point: "this modern element would constitute a 'second 
tier' army within the old army, capable of operating in 
new dimensions of time and space and independent of the 
main mass which proceeded at the pace of the footsoldier 11 • 10 
Thus, the British Army, its early tank lead discarded, 
had a capability of moving by unarmoured vehicle that gave 
it a notional capacity to compensate for its shortcomings 
in armour. 
Nevertheless, according to the enthusiasts for armour 
there could not be any substitute for a large, modern, 
tank force. The evidence seemed to support this view, 
for example the British employed tanks in 1917-18 to restore 
mobility on the Western Front. Further, 'Blitzkrieg' -
the mode of warfare employed by the German Army against 
4 
the Polish Army in 1939 - was led, on the ground, by tanks. 
Furthermore, theoretically, the writings of such military 
commentators as Fuller and Liddell Hart supported this 
contention. The theoretical content of the problem which 
existed in 1940, is, therefore, that when a significant 
relationship might fairly be assumed between capital 
technological advantage and capability in war, it is 
necessary to consider the relationship of various orders 
of technology to the successful prosecution of military 
operations. 
Outstanding commanders - it is suggested that R.N. 
O'Connor* and B.L. Montgomery** were two of great importance 
- realised that the solution to this problem lay only partly 
in attempting to comprehend the potential significance 
of developments at unstable military technological 
frontiers. Perhaps more importantly, to them it lay in 
acknowledging the significance of apparently more mundane 
military technological changes not only for tactics but 
also for operational military strategy. These changes 
would need only to be understood and brought to an adequate 
level of efficiency. 
The research problem can thus be boiled down to perhaps 
two questions •. It may be fairly assumed that high 
technological advantage and capability in war have a 
significant relationship. Nevertheless, evidence from 
the conduct of the campaigns in France and Belgium and 
*O'Connor, General Sir Richard, 1889-1981. British 
commander, Western Desert Force, 1940-41, GOC-in-C, 
British Troops in Egypt, 1941, February; captured and 
imprisoned in Castle Vincigliata, near Florence, 1941, 
April; escaped, 1943, September; commander: VIII Corps, 
North-West Europe, 1944-45; later Adjutant General 
to the Forces, Commandant of the Army Cadet Force, 
Scotland, Colonel of the Cameronians(Scottish Rifles), 
Lord Lieutenant for Ross and Cromarty. 
** Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount of Alamein, 1887-
1976. British commander, 3rd Division, France, Belgium, 
1939-40; various commands, Home Forces, 1940-42, 
including Southeastern Army; commander: 8th Army in 
North Africa, 1942-43, and Italy, 1943-44, 21st Army 
Group, North-West Europe, 1944-45; later CIGS, Commander 
NATO forces in Europe, author. 
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Egypt and Libya in 1940 points to its being possible for 
a commander to be successful with what may be called second 
order technology against an enemy that has apparently 
decisive first order technological advantages. Is it 
possible, therefore, for a commander to use second order 
technology to achieve the capacity for success in 
operations? Indeed, did certain British Army commanders' 
employment of an improved troop-carrying capacity to 
successfully enhance their operational capabilities early 
in the Second World War, reveal that a commander may achieve 
the capacity for success in operations with second order 
technology against an enemy which has seemingly decisive 
technological advantages? If so, what are the conditions 
that would enable the commander relying on second order 
technology to gain an advantage over his technologically 
superior enemy? 
1.1.1 Commanders, Technologies and Solutions, 1940-41 
Did Lieutenant-General R.N. O'Connor's and Major-General 
B.L. Montgomery's use of 'motorised' means of transport 
and mobility to achieve strategic advantages in operations 
in France and Belgium, Egypt and Libya, during 1940-41, 
suggest that it may be feasible for a commander to employ 
second order technology to prosecute successful military 
operations against an enemy with an apparently decisive 
technological superiority? The foundati-0n of this first 
subproblem is set out in the brief narratives that follow. 
Bredin recounts a tale about Montgomery's taking over 
the 8th Division in Palestine at the end of 1938, "an 
Irishman among Irish soldiers". He told them on a visit 
to the headquarters of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Ulster 
Rifles: "The war will come next year - 1939. We shall 
fight the Boche, yes, the Boche. I have told the Military 
Secretary I will command the 3rd Division and take them 
to France and you, yes you and your Battalion, will come 
6 
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with me. 1111 This was, as is now clear, a remarkable 
prophesy. On 1st September 1939 the German Army invaded 
Poland; two days later Britain was again at war with 
Germany; the 2nd Battalion, R.U.R. did form part of 
'Monty's' command: 3rd Division, II Corps, British 
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F.). 
Anticipating that the decisive German attack would, 
as in 1914, come through neutral Belgium,. Allied operational 
strategy (Plan 'D') determined that, at the first indication 
of attack, Allied troops - to include the B.E.F. - would 
advance sixty miles into Belgium to the River Dyle. 
However, the German operational strategy in its final form 
('Sichelschnitt'), determined that, in the north, Army 
Group 'B' would advance into Holland and Belgium so as 
to draw as much of the Allied strength as possible to its 
front. In the south, Army Group 'C' would stand on the 
defensive facing the Maginot Line. In the centre, however, 
Army Group 'A', allocated the bulk of the German Army's 
armoured forces, would attack through the forests of the 
Ardennes, destroying the centre of the Allied front and 
cutting the Allied forces in two. 12 
On 10th May 1940, Germany launched its offensive in 
the West; the B.E.F. advanced into Belgium; and battle 
was joined. German armour, achieving the deep strategic 
penetration of the Allied centre envisioned in 
'Sichelschnitt', placed the B.E.F., now retreating on 
.Dunkirk, in a dangerous position when, having reached the 
French coast at Abbeville, the Germans turned to seize 
the Channel Ports to the Allies' rear. On the 27th the 
Belgians' decision to lay down their arms made this 
situation one of deadly peril. But, at short notice, 
Montgomery, in a night move by mechanical transport (M.T.), 
was able to re-position his division and establish an 
eastern defensive flank for the B.E.F.: "a task'', wrote 
the commander of II Corps, Lieutenant-General Alan Brooke, 
"that might well have shaken the stoutest of hearts, but 
for Monty it might just have been a glorious picnic! 1113 
Monty's manoeuvre on the night of 27th May - he had 
trained his division for just such a manoeuvre because 
8 
his professionalism had led him to expect disaster - helped 
a large part of the B.E.F. to escape encirclement and to 
get to Dunkirk in sufficient time to be evacuated to Britain 
to fight another day. The port remained in Allied hands 
until 4th June, by which time some 337,000 British and 
Allied troops had been evacuated. 
In late 1938, Palestine received another Irish general: 
O'Connor. When Montgomery left to command a division in 
Europe, O'Connor remained in the Middle East. He was in 
command of Western Desert Force - the small British and 
Commonwealth force facing the Italian colony of Libya -
when, in June 1940 Italy entered the Second World War. 
The main fighting element of the Western Desert Force (from 
1941, January, XIII Corps) comprised the 7th Armoured 
Division (Commander: Major-General M. O'M Creagh) and the 
4th Indian Division ( Major-General N.M. de la P. 
Beresford-Peirse) [replaced 1941, January, by the 6th 
Australian Division (Major-General I. Mackay)]. The Support 
Group, 7th Armoured Division, included two motorized 
infantry battalions: 2nd Batalion, The Rifle Brigade, and 
1st Battalion, The King's Royal Rifle Corps. 14 Italy's 
entry into the War seemed to dangerously threaten Britain's 
position in the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and North 
Africa. On 13th September 1940 the Italian 10th Army 
crossed the Egyptian frontier and advanced some sixty miles 
towards Sidi Barrani, then halted and built a series of 
fortified encampments. The Italian forces (Forze Armate) 
in North Africa, commanded by Marshal Rudolpho Graziani, 
consisted of the equivalent of fourteen divisions organized 
into two armies. The 10th Army (Commander: General Mario 
Berti) [replaced 1940, December, by General Giuseppe 
Tellera] was the one immediately facing O'Connor. Farther 
west, in Tripolitania, was the 5th Army (General Italo 
Garibaldi) of about the same strength and Forty states 
that the Italians used their 5th Army to reinforce the 
10th. 15 The British Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, 
General Sir Archibald Wavel felt that a limited offensive 
against the Italians was a viable proposition. The 
operational commander would be O'Connor. Codenamed 
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Operation 'Compass', the operation was to be a five-day 
raid to destroy the enemy's bridgehead in Egypt. 16 
After careful reconnaissance, in great secrecy, the 
British force moved into position on the night of 8th 
December 1940. The 4th Indian Division was to break through 
the Italian defences at Sidi Barrani and then press ahead 
along the coast road; the 7th Armoured Division was to 
operate on the open southern flank in a series of 
wide-ranging out-flanking movements~ Taken completely 
by surprise, the Italians fell back in disarray, and, in 
a matter of days, had been expelled from Egypt. 
O'Connor was determined to advance into Cyrenaica, 
the eastern province of Libya. On 5th January 1941 the 
coastal fortress of Bardia fell to O'Connor's forces; the 
7th Armoured Division having deployed into the desert to 
block all Italian escape to the north and northwest, some 
40,000 Italians were taken prisoner. Next to fall was 
Tobruk, the major port of eastern Libya; Italian resistance 
was stronger than that encountered previously, but by 22nd 
January the town was in British hands. 
Once Tobruk had fallen, it was decided in London that 
operations in the Western Desert should be subordinated 
to the need to aid Greece, now threatened with German 
attack. The capture of Tobruk had not, however, lessened 
the momentum and need to consolidate O'Connor's advance. 
The need to relieve the strain on his transport of moving 
troops and bringing up supplies of petrol, oil, food, and 
ammunition over such immense distances of desert was met 
to some extent by pressing into service hundreds of Italian 
vehicles captured at Tobruk. O'Connor saw a chance to 
destroy the Italian 10th Army in its entirety. If he 
continued to advance along the coast he would certainly 
push the enemy out of Cyrenaica. But if instead he sent 
7th Armoured Division across the desert to the coast, ahead 
of the rapidly retreating Italians, he might forestall 
a successful Italian withdrawal to Tripolitania (the western 
province of Libya) and thus prevent the survival of a 
significant part of the Italian 10th Army. 
An Australian force (6th Austalian Division had replaced 
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4th Indian Division) harried the Italians out of Derna 
(which fell on 30th January), while British tanks and 
armoured cars, lorried infantry and guns drove across the 
desert, through Mechili, to Msus oasis. Creagh, comanding 
the 7th Armoured Division, believed his force might well 
be too late to complete the south-eastern envelopment 
envisioned by O'Connor. He ordered a wheeled force -
Combeforce, led by Lieutenant-Colonel John Combe, C.O. 
of the 11th Hussars - to race ahead of the tanks and cut 
the coast road south of Benghazi as soon as possible. 
Arriving to join Creagh at Msus, this decision was endorsed 
by O'Connor. 
Just after midday on 5th February 1941 Combeforce 
reached the coast road some ten miles south of Beda Fomm. 
In mid-afternoon the vanguard of the first Italian column 
appeared and the battle of Beda Fomm began. The Italians 
tried to break through. They failed. 
O'Connor's chief of staff, Field Marshal Lord Harding 
(as he became) said of O'Connor's achievement that: "it 
was his skill in calculating the risks and his daring in 
accepting them that turned what might have been a limited 
success into a victorious campaign •.• "16 
'Compass' precipitated German intervention in North 
Africa and not for a further two years would the prize 
of Tripoli, the capital of the Italian colony of Libya, 
fall to the Allies. However, the success of 'Compass', 
and its subsequent exploitation - the first British 
strategic offensive of the Second World war - allowed the 
British Army to show, after the drubbing it had recieved 
at Dunkirk, its true worth, in the hands of an outstanding, 
imaginative commander. 
The second subproblem thrown up by the initial research 
question is: if the applications of motorisation by generals 
Montgomery and O'Connor suggest a positive determination 
as to whether it is viable for a commander to employ second 
order technology to realise the capacity for success in 
operations, even against a technologically, materially, 
and numerically superior enemy, what conditions permit 
the creation of a strategically advantageous situation, 
12 
untenable for the enemy? 
O'Connor and Montgomery were 'Irish'. They did not 
come from what might be termed 'aristocratic' backgrounds. 
They were close personal friends. In the professional 
sphere, both were infantrymen. Neither had been strongly 
aligned with one faction or the other in the debates on 
mechanization between the wars.~ Both were thoughtful 
officers, however, who appreciated the strategic 
shortcomings revealed in the First World War but were 
largely content to work for improvement in their own arm 
and areas of experience. The growing mechanical reliability 
of road vehicles in the inter-war period and developments 
with respect to their ability to traverse difficult terrain 
offered new possibilities for operational strategic 
flexibility, that Montgomery and O'Connor were to show 
themselves able to exploit. 
But there were differences. Montgomery was using 
lorries, light utilities, cars and carriers to implement 
a defensive operatonal strategy of a fighting withdrawal. 
Vehicles had a well-established road network to operate 
upon. O'Connor used a wide variety of vehicle types to 
support an offensive operational strategy of a large-scale 
raid which developed into long-range pursuit. The difficult 
terrain made it clear, for example, that henceforth, tank 
transporting would be an essential part of the mobility 
of armoured forces in North Africa. 
The leadership of Montgomery and O'Connor, particularly 
their command skills and operational strategic insights 
with respect to the employment of second order technology 
in these two cases, gives rise to the hypothesis for this 
study which is: that in war insight, imagination, 
initiative, originality, and dynamic leadership may enable 
strategic advantage to be achieved with second order 
technology despite an enemy's technological primacy. 
13 
1.2 The Methods of Research 
At this point, some indication as to methodology is 
intended: this involves establishing what is relevant 
research data and the nature of such data; criteria for 
the admission of relevant data into the research design; 
and the appropriate research methodologies. 
Study of any part of the Second World War is not always 
served by an attempt to impose an absolutely precise 
positoning in time on the period selected for study. The 
scope of this research requires movement backwards and 
forwards in time: back to the problems of re-equipping 
and expanding a neglected Army, and forward, through 
May-June, and December 1940 - which saw, respectively, 
the withdrawal to, and evacuation of, part of the B.E.F. 
from Dunkirk, and the commencement in North Africa of the 
first British strategic offensive of the Second World War. 
Data is used from the period 1919-39 and the years 1939-45, 
where appropriate, but is principally required from 1940 
and 1941. 
The following was required: data on the military careers 
of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery and General Sir Richard 
O'Connor, with particular reference to Montgomery's command 
of 3rd Division, II Corps, B.E.F., 1939-40, and O'Connor's 
command of the Western Desert Force, 1940-41; the actual 
course of military operations in France and Belgium 
following Germany's attack on France, Belgium, and Holland, 
1940, and of Operation 'Compass' against the Italian 10th 
Army, December 1940-February 1941; and the most important 
developments with respect to the motorization of the British 
Army to 1940. 
The United Kingdom Public Record Office, Kew, is the 
principal repository for the records arising from the 
administration and command of the British Army in the period 
treated of in this dissertation. 
The Imperial War Museum is a repository for documentary 
records of all types which record all aspects of the two 
world wars and of military operations involving Britain 
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and the Commonwealth since 1914. These include one of 
Britain's largest collections of British private papers, 
among which are the diaries, correspondence, and other 
writings of Field-Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein. 
The Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's 
College, London, holds a growing collection of the private 
papers of 20th century senior British officers: here are 
to be found the papers of General Sir Richard O'Connor 
KT, GCB, DSO, MC. 
The Museum of (British)Army Transport, Beverley, North 
Yorkshire, has been an important source of information 
on improvements in technologies of military transportation 
associated with the development of the internal combust~on 
engine. The re-evaluation of tactics and strategy (when 
coupled with outstanding generalship) which necessarily 
followed these technical developments is this dissertation's 
theme. 
Much of the data is neither published in print nor 
by electronic means. This necessitated these data sources 
to be accessed by personal visits~ 
Spencer Wilkinson, first Professor of the History of 
War at Oxford, said that the first task of the military 
historian was the sifting of the evidence with a view to 
the establishment of the facts. As Howard points out, 
however, this objective may be easier to state than it 
is to achieve. 17 Kerlinger states that the precept of 
the primary source is a good one for the historical 
investigator. 18 For this dissertation's purposes, it is 
considered that this precept is applicable to the private 
papers of Field-Marshal Montgomery, General O'Connor, and 
others, and that the precept of 'primary-ness' can validly 
be extended to include personally narrated accounts of 
events (where sound records or transcripts exist), and 
to published material of either principal protagonist which 
relates to the dissertation's subject matter. Reports 
of events, operations orders, intelligence summaries, and 
so on, in the records of the War Office and related 
departments are also considered primary sources. 
The methodologies which most lend themselves to the 
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rigorous research of the problem are primarily the 
Historical Method for the examination of subproblem one 
and primarily a comparative methodology for the inquiry 
into subproblem two. 
The historical method in social-scientific research 
is the attempt to solve problems arising out of a historical 
context through gathering and examining relevant data: 
it permits collection, evaluation, and interpretation of 
data: in other words, it provides a framework within which 
the facts can be placed so that their meaning can begin 
to be seen more clearly. Fourie points out that there 
is little doubt that history provides an important 
foundation for the study of strategy. 19 Gilbert ascribes 
the appreciation of the value of military history to the 
work of Clausewitz (1780-1831), who identified the 
relationship between battle and war and between war and 
the general policy of the state. 20 Hence, if war were 
to be undertaken as an instrument of policy, and Clausewitz 
maintained it had to be, military history had to instruct 
those who employed war both in the utility of war and in 
the manner in which it should be conducted. The manner 
in which it is to be conducted relates naturally to 
strategy, and hence to Strategic Studies. 
Howard, following Delbrilck, notes the dangers for both 
the service person who turns to history and the academic 
who turns to military affairs. 21 Military History attempts 
to avoid these pitfalls, through the use of the Historical 
Method. 
The hypothesis for this research suggests that a 
non-linear, dynamic relationship exists between technplogy, 
strategy and the outcome of war. The capacity for success 
in war is not reducible merely to technological advantage; 
nor solely to the attributes of a particular commander. 
Yet, it may be fairly assumed that high level technological 
advantage and capability in war have a significant 
relationship. Military history, however, can also show 
the contrary: that the military advantages conferred by -
high technology are transitory against an adaptive and 
resourceful opponent. 'Technological factors' and 
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'commanders' decisions' do not belong in separate conceptual 
'black boxes'; the outputs of their interraction influences 
the formulation of strategy, which may or may not achieve 
the desired outcome: successful military operations. 
Howard remarks that the military historian knows what 
is victory and what defeat, what is success and what 
failure; that when activities constantly recur, and their 
success can be assessed by a straightforward standard, 
it does not seem over-optimistic to assume that we can 
make judgements about them and draw conclusions which will 
have an abiding value. 22 The British Army's capability, 
early in the Second World War, of moving by vehicle is 
used in this research to establish a notional capacity 
to compensate for its shortcomings in armour and lack of 
a large, modern, tank force. 
Montgomery wrote that a military commander must decide 
in his own mind, and before the battle begins, how he wants 
operations to develop; he must then use the military effort 
at his disposal to force the battle to swing the way he 
wants. This involves unbalancing the enemy by manoeuvre. 23 
Having established that moto~ization of the Br~tish Army 
to 1940 notionally offered resourceful commanders means 
to mitigate problems of military technological lag, how 
O'Connor and Montgomery each exploited this, by strategic 
manoeuvre, to unbalance technologically superior enemy 
forces, will be treated of. The initial, first, problem, 
then, involves testing the hypothesis by evidence, 
confirmatory or otherwise, from the data. 
The resolution of subproblem two calls not so much 
for further data as for more comprehensive interpretation. 
The Comparative Method is one of the basic methods of 
discovering empirical relationships among variables in 
scientific research; 'comparable' means similar in a large 
number of characteristics, or variables, which one wants 
to treat as constraints, but dissimilar as far as those 
variables are concerned which one wants to relate to each 
other. Some of the significant similarities, and 
differences, with respect to the two cases of the 
application of motorization selected for consideration 
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have already been highlighted. 
Some delimitations must be made in order to 
operationalize this research. The first delimitation is 
that while logistics can be construed to include all 
activities involved in the administrative support of an 
army, this dissertation will focus on 'transportation' 
and movement in operations. 
The second delimitation is that the movement of forces 
by sea or air shall not generally be considered in the 
dissertation. 
The third delimitation is that by virtue of the 
empirical content of the case study the movement of forces 
by rail is not of concern either. The theoretical content 
of the research problem demands consideration of lessons 
drawn from parallels with the development of the employment 
of the steam locomotive which enabled mass armies to be 
moved rapidly to frontiers and sometimes even laterally 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The term first order technology in the context of this 
dissertation denotes tanks and all other armoured fighting 
vehicles, acquired by an army, for the purpose of affording 
mobility and offensive power in military operations through 
application of techniques of armoured, mechanized warfare; 
'second order technology' describes the lorries, trucks, 
cars, and other vehicles, including specialist vehicles, 
available to improve mobility in military operations. 
The term motorization may be defined as a school of 
thought, line of development, or policy with respect to 
the employment of means of transport and movement utilizing 
the internal combustion petrol engine - usually unarmoured 
lorries and cars - for the purpose of providing, or 
improving, mobility in military operations. 
The term logistics, for the purposes of this 
dissertation, will be taken to mean: "the practical art 
f . d k h l" d" 24 Th o moving armies an eeping t em supp ie • e 
importance of 'transportation', covering transport for 
all methods of movement and supply, must be implicit in 
any definition of logistics. 
Some assumptions must also be made throughout this 
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dissertation. The first of these is that it is assumed 
that a commander's operational concept - his design of 
the way in which a military force, specifically allocated 
to a particular operation, is used to create a military 
situation that ideally will be either untenable for the 
enemy or most advantageous for himself may be influenced 
by technology. Technology may affect the nature and quality 
of resources available to him in support of his overall 
aim. 
This study is also premised on an assumption that if 
the selected applications of motorization are compared 
and contrasted, significant conclusions should be possible 
with respect to relationships between various orders of 
technology and resourceful commanders' capacities for 
success in war. 
1.3 Conclusion: The Importance of the Study 
Fourie writes that, by the centenary of Waterloo the 
internal combustion engine had provided the ability to 
move freely away from railway lines and indeed, to fly 
over other armies, and that all these changes were 
significant not only for tactics but also for operational 
military strategy and needed only to be understood and 
b h d 1 1 f ff · · 25 Th. h roug t to an a equate eve o e ic1ency. is researc 
on two commanders' exploitation, through strategic 
manoeuvre, of the potential for mobility and flexibility 
conferred by improved technical means of troop-transport 
tests the hypothesis that, with outstanding generalship, 
second order technology may be used to attain strategic 
advantage despite an enemy's technological primacy. This 
study of two great commanders' applications against all 
odds, of the techniques of motorization, will contribute 
to applied research in Strategic Studies with evidence 
or otherwise of the generalizability of Fourie's 
proposition. 
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Flowing from the hypothesis, the following factors 
need to be examined - and therefore constitute the remaining 
chapters of this dissertation. 
A literature study - classifying and analysing related 
literature for concepts and approaches to provide a 
theoretical basis for this research and reviewing the 
background literature synoptically for empirical evidence 
of the existence of technological-strategic relationships 
- follows this, the first chapter. Chapters One and Two, 
together, constitute a framework for analysis and 
interpretation. 
In Chapter 3, the British Army's failure to pursue 
development of an independent armoured force, but to favour 
instead improving its traditional arms' capabilities of 
movement by unarmoured and lightly armoured vehicle, and 
how the protagonists viewed all this, is detailed. 
Chapter 4 introduces the military careers, to 1940, 
of Generals B.L. Montgomery and R.N. O'Connor. It appraises 
their leadership strengths and assesses the relevance of 
their earlier military experiences for the understanding 
of motorization which they would demonstrate in 1940. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to the two cases: how Montgomery 
and O'Connor each exploited the improved capabilities of 
the means of transportation and movement available to them 
to enhance their capacity to act strategically, and 
unbalance technologically, materially, and numerically 
superior enemy forces. 
These 'isolated incidents' were not lucky chance but 
substantiated Montgomery's and O'Connor's command skills 
and were applications of their operational strategic 
insights with respect to the employment of second order 
technology. In Chapter 6 an explanation is offered of how 
O'Connor and Montgomery achieved strategic advantages. 
This is followed by the final chapter which concludes 
as to the relationship of the thoughtful use of second 
order technology in the absence of an adequate armoured 
force and the advantages achieved in the two cases~ It 
finds that effective responses were possible by imaginative, 
progressive, thoughtful commanders. 
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CHAPTER 2 
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC APPLICATIONS OF SECOND ORDER 
TECHNOLOGY: A REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE, 1918-40 
2.1 Introduction 
It would be useful to review at this point the various 
intellectual trends in the writings of the inter-war period 
on the subject of the operational strategic effects of 
second order technology in land warfare, to highlight this 
work's unique perspective. 
In the period which saw the development of the railways, 
the steam locomotive had enabled militarily capable powers 
to move their mass armies to frontiers and sometimes even 
laterally. The evidence for the operational significance 
and consequences of applications of permanent way technology 
to problems of mobility in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries is reviewed. Parallels from how 
commanders employed the steam locomotive to move troops 
quickly provide a theoretical basis or background for an 
analysis of the assumptions and approaches of strategists, 
commanders, and commentators in the 1920s and 1930s to 
potential applications of second order automotive technology 
in the strategic movement of forces. The most 
straightforward way to proceed is to classify the writers 
along national lines, then analyse the writings in terms 
of writers' concepts for notional uses of motorized 
transport for the strategic movement of forces. 
It is particularly important to see where O'Connor 
and Montgomery stood. An attempt is made to determine 
whether either had ever investigated the strategic 
employment of lorries or other motor vehicles, or written 
anything published or unpublished, and the sources of 
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influences on their thought. 
Finally, the various approaches are synthesised so 
that one can see the different ways practitioners writing 
between the two world wars made an attempt to consider 
additional, strategic, or alternative roles for motorized 
transport. The conclusions, about what people were writing 
in the literature that appeared during those years, provides 
a theoretical basis which further sets the context for 
the examination of the data of this research. 
2.2 Classification and Analysis 
Second order technology has affected strategy at the 
operational level throughout military history. "New means 
of transport and communication," it has been suggested, 
"have changed the ability to project power. 111 Tempting 
as it is to go back over the vast, extraordinary 
heterogeneity of transport great commanders have used to 
enhance their capacity to deploy military force, the most 
important analogy in the development of modern military 
transportation prior to motorization, for the purposes 
of this dissertation, was probably commanders' use of 
railways to move their large armies over great distances. 
It is worthwhile to consider what the literature has 
to say concerning the thinking and practice of.American 
and Prussian generals during the period which saw the 
development of railways, as well as to determine what 
actually happened and to contrast prior views with actual 
experience. Sinclair's Arteries Of War, Macksey's 
Technology In War, and Van Creveld's Supplying War in 
particular have insights into rail transport in military 
h . 2 istory. 
Union commander, William Tecsumseh Sherman said his 
Atlanta Campaign (September-December 1864) in the American 
Civil War (1861-65) would have been an impossibility without 
the railway to keep him supplied. 3 Railways gave an immense 
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new mobility to the armies. It was however the Confederates 
who most depended on the railways. But when in 1862 they 
wanted to move troops quickly from east Virginia to the 
Shenandoah Valley to exploit the victories of Stonewall 
Jackson they were unable to quickly enough because of a 
lack of rolling stock. The Confederate commander, Robert 
E. Lee also attempted to use railways to shift Jackson's 
army suddenly from the &henandoah Valley to Richmond, which 
was being threatened by Union commander, George McClellan 
in his Peninsula Campaign (March - July 1862). Lee had 
soon realized that, for reasons which included his forces' 
numerical disadvantages, their only hope of victory lay 
in rapid concentrations of their entire strength against 
one or other part of the Union Army. For this they needed 
to take full advantage of their interior lines of 
communication; that is, of their railways. However, 
Confederate commanders were not able to achieve the 
coordination desired by Lee and McClellan was able to parry 
the attempt to force him to a decisive battle at 
Mechanicsville on 26th June 1862. 4 
For Count Helmuth von Moltke, Chief of the Prussian 
General Staff during Prussia's wars for German unification 
(1864, 1866, 1870-71), railways were an essential instrument 
for the conduct of war. Like Lee, Moltke also assumed 
the importance of concentration and the advantage of 
interior lines and his strategies gave railways a similarly 
important role. His prior thinking on the military 
importance of railways derived from his hypothesis that 
as Prussia's army was not entirely a standing force (being 
partly standing/conscript and partly reserve called to 
form shadow divisions), the Prussian Army would always, 
initially, be outnumbered. Railways could be used to 
compress space and time, enabling sufficient forces and 
resources to be prepared, mobilized, concentrated, deployed, 
and moved. However, it has been suggested by Van Creveld 
that, in the campaigns of 1866 and 1870-71, the deployment 
and movement of Prussian forces was influenced less by 
strategic considerations than by factors such as the 
geographical configuration and the capacity of the 
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·1 5 rai ways. 
As revealed in the professional literature, much of 
British military interest in automotive technology between 
the two world wars was associated with practical questions 
relating to the extension of its uses in logistics and 
with enhancing the infantry's mobility at the le~el of 
major warfare, but also at the level of small wars of 
colonial peacekeeping. 
The British Army's interpretation of the lessons of 
the First World War may be summarised as the belief that 
ultimate Allied victory, however costly, had completely 
vindicated the strategy of attrition and that this doctrine, 
therefore, should be strictly maintained in the army's 
future planning. This interpretation was supported in 
the multi-volume series, the Official History Of The Great 
War, implicitly the national account of Britain's 
involvement in the First World War. The volume, 
Transportation On The Western Front 1914-1918 was compiled 
to show some of the principal transport problems which 
arose on the Western Front, the origin, growth, and general 
organisation of the services set up to deal with those 
problems, and the rise of a number of separate services 
connected with transportation which were amalgamated into 
a single service called Transportation. 6 The series was 
and continues to be the subject of considerable controversy. 
Throughout the inter-war years, the British Army 
supported five major professional journals: Journal of 
the Royal United Service Institution(inter-service), Army 
Quarterly, Cavalry Journal, Journal of the Royal Artillery, 
and Journal of the Royal Engineers. These were much more 
than 'regimental' publications devoted to promotions, 
sports, and social life. All were seriously interested 
in lessons to be learned from the Great War and in the 
strategic problems facing the Empire. 
An important problem with which the British Army had 
to contend in the First World War, particularly on the 
Western Front, arose from the fact that, while the artillery 
eventually had sufficient guns and shells, guns had 
developed into new categories. They were now often 
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howitzers - to fire shells through high trajectories into 
the enemy trench system - and medium or heavy guns - used 
to fire the kind of heavy, high explosive round intended 
to break up the enemy's defences. To move such guns was 
quite beyond the traditional horse team. Better mobility 
for larger weapons and their heavier ammunition, and more 
rapid deployment were key factors: either rail or 
motorization could be sBlutions. A highly developed rail 
network enabled movement and resupply behind and near the 
Front. Though horses, mules, and light railways were often 
used to take ammunition up to forward battery positions, 
in forward areas motor transport came into its own, vastly 
increasing the amount of ammunition which could be brought 
up. The substitution of motor vehicles for animal traction 
to move guns was one of the important lessons of the First 
World War drawn by British artillerymen. As one writer 
put it in 1939: 
From the beginning of the Great War it was plain 
that modern motor transport had made it possible to 
use far larger guns in the field than ever before, 
those known as ''heavies", which could not be dragged 
by horses and had, therefore, scarcel¥ been used except 
in fortresses for defensive purposes. 
On the Western Front the warfare had in large measure 
been static and attritional. The provision of better 
logistical supply to the front lines had been another 
significant problem. Although rations and stores usually 
had to be manhandled into the trenches mechanical transport 
was employed to vastly increase the amount of supplies 
which could be brought forward from railheads to troops 
in the front line. As described in the Journal of the 
Royal United Service Institution in 1933: 
The masses led and administered were mainly 
stationary, while to supply them ••. there were swiftly 
speeding, large-capacity carriers - r~ilway truck and 
lorry. This was no war of distances. 
Now, material could notionally be moved by mechanical 
transport in greater quantities but at several times the 
speed of the horse-drawn vehicles previously used: 
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Administration in the forward areas of mobility, 
ahead of the railhead, has raised its functions off 
the ground, and now demands transportation on wheels 
for them. Wherever the petrol engine enters the field, 
replacing the animal, we see greater load-carrying, 
much more speed, and less attendant personnel, while 
every increase in its efficiency connotes ipso facto 
a yet further decrease in this ijersonnel, as is occuring 
daily in industry and commerce. 
How would infantry move on a future battlefield? This 
was another problem facing British strategists and 
commanders in the 1920s and 1930s. The Army's initial 
understanding of the role of the unarmoured transport 
vehicle in relation to this problem was outlined in articles 
in the Army Quarterly and the Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution from which the following observations 
were typical: 
Unarmoured cars, the 'lighter forms of van and lorry 
take the part of mounted riflemen as they simply carry 
men to battle, retire to a rendezvous ready either 
to bring m~0 e or await orders from the first 
contingent (emphasis mine). 
Even if transportation be such that troops can 
be carried rapidly by road (or rail) from one part 
of the theatre of operations to another, the problem 
of bringing them within striking dis}fnce of their 
objective still remains to be solved (emphasis mine). 
In fact, the infantry's problem on the Western Front had 
not been inability to penetrate enemy positions, but the 
ability to exploit initial success. Recognizing this, 
in 1932 the official Report On The Lessons Of The Great 
War [called the Kirke Report] concluded: 
The key to converting a "break in" into a "break 
through" appears to be a highly mobile reserve 
containing a powerful punch supplied by armoured 
fighting vehicles and mechanized infantry, with a 
sufficiency of cavalry or lorry borne infantry and 
mechanized machine guns to secure successive 1 ~ases from which the tanks can make a fresh bound. 
During the 1930s the 'Bren carrier' had made its appearance 
in British infantry battalions as a weapons carrier. The 
light infantry mind soon saw the possibility of using these 
vehicles for combat. It is not surprising, then, that 
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towards the end of the inter-war period, Lieutenant-Colonel 
John Reeve, commander of the British Army's first Motor 
Battalion set forth in the following way the purposes for 
which the new motor battalions existed: 
To constitute a pivot [meaning a fire-support cum 
infantry support unit] from which armour could operate; 
to overcome, with its rifles, bren-guns, mortars and 
tactical expertise, any obstacles impeding an armoured 
advance; to clear, when necessary, villages, woods 
and enclosed country; to force the passage of rivers 
and deny them to the enemy; to protect the tank leaguers 
at night; to hold captured positions and ground; to 
round up and take charge of prisoners after a 
break-through; to carry out patrols and reconnaissance, 
and to do f ~3 tanks whatever tanks could not do for 
themselves. 
The British Army, however, had a second role, that 
of imperial gendarmerie. It was required to fight small, 
colonial wars in theatres where important assets could 
be the improvement of the capabilities of speed and range 
of manoeuvre. "The British Army, as has often been stated, 
exists for two main purposes - a European war and an 
insurrection within the Empire, and it is on the use of 
mechanical transport for the latter purpose that this 
article attempts to focus attention," wrote one contributor 
to the Army Quarterly in 1937. 14 It was widely believed 
that a mixed, mechanized force which would probably consist 
of armoured fighting vehicles of suitable type, infantry 
in buses or lorries supported by mechanized first-line 
transport and mechanized artillery, together with the 
necessary auxilliary units would provide commanders with 
the capacity to execute operations involving wide lateral 
movements speedily. As another officer had put it in a 
prize-winning essay in the Journal of the Royal United 
Service Institution in 1930: 
The principal characteristic of operations against 
a semi-civilized or uncivilized enemy must be that 
he will generally be unorganized, without definite 
communications, and lacking in modern equipment, 
especially aircraft, armoured forces, or means of 
defence against these. His strength will lie largely 
in his extreme mobility, enabling him to elude a force 
hampered with the impedimenta of civilisation. Anything 
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tending to reduce the odds, therefore, will be an 
advantage. If mechanization makes a force more nearly 
ubiquitous, as the enemy may often seem to be, any 
additional gain in this respect will be greatly to 
the good, while the moral effect of a rapid appearance 
at a considerable distance must prove very great. 
The arrival of an armed force on the spot, at the 
earliest possible moment when trouble is threatened, 
may quell an insu:recttgn before it has assumed 
dangerous proportions. 
The advantages and disadvantages of mounting troops on 
motor lorries had been summarised in an article in the 
Army Quarterly in 1922. On the one hand, lorries could 
move troops quickly to a desired spot. They could operate 
at long distances from their base. They can carry 
machine-guns and a wide range of military stores and 
equipment. They reduce troop fatigue to a minimum. On 
the other hand, the sound of a lorry engine - particularly 
at night - can alert insurgents that troops are approaching. 
Lorry-mounted troops are particulary vulnerable to attack 
by ambush. Lorries do not counter the element of human 
fatigue; lorries are uncomfortable - particularly in 
Winter. 16 Apart from these practical disadvantages, many 
were unconvinced of any advantage to motorization in 
imperial counter-insurrgency, on the grounds that: "to 
rely entirely upon a motorized army would appear to be 
courting a series of indecisive campaigns [such as did 
happen in Ireland in 1920 and 1921]~" 17 His solution was: 
"that we might cease our "joy riding" in lorries and get 
down to the business we had been taught." 18 
For this dissertation, the important feature to note 
was absence of any official consideration of a strategic 
role at the level of major warfare for motorized transport 
additional or alternative to its logistic uses in the 
movement of men, guns, and suplies. The role of mechanical 
transport was expected to remain primarily the movement 
and sustenance of operating forces in the execution of 
attrition strategy. This reflected earlier thinking and 
experience. To summarise mainstream British military 
thought with respect to the employment of unarmoured 
mechanical transport at the level of major warfare, it 
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was concerned primarily - particularly in the 1920s - with 
the application of motorization to logistical problems 
of movement and supply. While others saw automotive 
transportation simply in the logistic sense without 
realising that it had the potential for strategic movement 
of forces, perhaps there ~ practitioners who realised 
that transportation had a deeper strategic significance. 
In this review what is available of what we may call 
strategic writing is sifted from the literature and analysed 
according to the approaches of practitioners. That is to 
say, consideration of additional or alternative uses for 
motorized transport in the manner that certain commanders 
in military history used the railways. This was the 
realization that the availability of mobility gave them 
not just the capacity to carry troops and supplies but 
to act strategically, that is, mobility gave operational 
strategic flexibility. The logistic writing addressed 
the problem of motorization in terms of administration, 
organization, and transportation. For the purposes of 
this dissertation it is important to determine what the 
literature reveals of theoretical concepts for the notional 
alternative employment of mechanical transport. This will 
constitute a unique theoretical perspective. An important 
trend in the literature dealt with mechanical transport, 
mechanized-armoured forces, and the capacity for success 
in future war. Several theorists stand out as being worthy 
of mention. 
There are, however, practical difficulties, some of 
which are alluded to by Richard Simpkin: 
I was struck immediately by the contrast between 
cavalry and armour on the one hand and mounted and 
mechanized infantry on the other. The first, along 
with their mounts from horse through tank to helicopter, 
are documented to the hilt. With the second, I have 
had difficulty in finding enough authoritatiy9 material 
to put even a historical framework together. 
Bond's British Military Policy Between The Two World 
Wars, an article by him based on a paper presented at the 
Swedish Royal Staff College of the Armed Forces in 1989, 
Larsen's British Army And The Theory Of Armoured Warfare, 
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and Higham's Armed Forces In Peacetime were utilized to 
review the replacement of animals by motor vehicles in 
the context of the evolution of British military p-0licy 
and official operational doctrine from 1918 to 1939. 20 
Bond's article makes the point that by default the Army 
was geared toward imperial defence. This was compatible 
with the mechanization of infantry and cavalry and was 
implemented, but it did not encourage use of the tank in 
large armoured formations. Higham has a useful bibliography 
of government publications, books and articles to offer. 
In those years, European military writing was apparently 
dominated by the British military commentators, Fuller 
and Liddell Hart, and there are percepive essays on them 
in Luvaas' Education Of An Army. 21 In terms of original 
ideas, Bond has described Fuller as a: "blazing comet", 
Liddell Hart: "a less brilliant but steadier star. 1122 
Both wrote extensively and are among the most interesting 
and widely read military writers produced by Britain. 
Biographies include Trythall's 'Boney' Fuller and Bond's 
Liddell Hart. 23 Klein's thesis, "J.F.C. Fuller And The 
Tank" traces Fuller's contribution to the development and 
use of the tank in the First World War. 24 
Marshal Mikhail Tukachevsky, General Charles de Gaulle, 
and General Heinz Guderian were significant - Russian, 
French, and German respectively - practitioners. Sources 
which have been utilized for their theories include 
O'Ballance's general history, The Red Army, Scott and 
Scott's Armed Forces Of The USSR on the Soviet Military 
and Soviet military affairs, Clarke's "Military Technology 
In Republican France: The Evolution Of The French Armoured 
Force, 1917-1940", Bond and Alexander's "Liddell Hart And 
De Gaulle: The Doctrines Of Limited Liability And Mobile 
Defense", Perret's history of the Reichswehr, then Wehrmacht 
Panzerwaffe, Knights Of The Black Cross, and Guderian's 
autobiography, Panzer Leader. Rommel's papers, edited 
by Liddel Hart, is a useful reference for the thinking 
of one of Germany's ablest panzer tactitians. It contains 
large sections of Rommel's book War Without Hate(Krieg 
ohne Hasse). 25 
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Tukachevsky is generally considered the outstanding 
inter-war Soviet military commander and strategist. In 
the late 1930s de Gaulle was a polemicist for a policy 
of metropolitain defence based on a highly professional 
mechanized army. A colonel at the outbreak of the Second 
World War, he was a tank brigade commander and briefly 
divisional commander of an armoured division before joining 
the government of Paul Reynaud as Under-Secretary of War. 
In Germany, between the two world wars, Guderian had an 
enormous influence on the evolution of the concept of 
organising tanks, mechanized infantry, and motorized support 
arms into mobile formations, capable of fast independent 
action. 
For Fuller, a capacity for armoured mobility corelated 
with the capacity for success in major warfare, that is 
military operations other than those which might be 
associated with colonial pacification and peacekeping. 26 
Medium or cruiser tanks and a new generation of specifically 
designed armoured cross-country vehicles would provide 
such a capacity. A tank force could efficiently execute 
the functions of demoralizing, disorganizing, and destroying 
the enemy. This, Fuller thought~ would render the existence 
of 'infantry', 'artillery', and 'cavalry' problematical. 27 
Fuller, however, recognised the widespread utilization 
of the unarmoured, wheeled mechanized load-carrier by the 
administrative and supply services of the British Army 
in the First World War as a significant development: "had 
not the lorry existed, it would have been impossible to 
have supplied the guns. 1128 All transport, therefore, should 
be 'mechanicalized' (motorized). 29 Tracked transport would 
be desirable. 30 Wheeled transport could play a role in 
future military operations at the level of a major war, 
b 1 . . 31 ut a ogistic one. 
Liddell Hart's concept, motorization, applied to the 
first stage of the mechanization he desired for the British 
32 Army: the development of logistic motorized transport. 
Motorization, as a process, was being accelerated by the 
33 introduction of the six-wheeled lorry. However, where 
the terrain was naturally difficult or where ground was 
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ploughed up by shell-fire - as had been the case with the 
battlefields on the Western Front in the First World War 
- wheeled mobility would be inferior to one based on 
tracks. 34 True mechanization, in Liddell Hart's opinion, 
should be armoured mechanization: 
So far as recent developments in equipment have 
gone, the armies are becoming motorized but not 
bullet-proof. They have far more mobility - until 
they meet opposition. To retain mobility whe~ 5 one 
comes under fire one needs armoured mobility. 
In his writings Liddell Hart pressed for the development 
of mechanized infantry as part of strategic armoured 
forces. 36 Armoured formations' integral infantry should 
not be equipped merely with vulnerable unarmoured vehicles 
but with tankettes or other, armoured, vehicles, from which 
37 they might dismount to act on foot. 
From the launch of the First Five Year Plan in 1928 
to the beginning of Stalin's purges of Soviet commanders 
in 1936 the Red Army experimented with mass mechanization. 
Marshal Klementi Voroshilov - in effect, Defence Minister, 
from 1925 - had always favoured equipping the Red Army 
with the latest and best means of mobility and as lorries 
became available formations of lorry-borne infantry were 
organised. 38 Sponsored and motivated by Tukachevsky -
Red Army Chief of Staff - groups of experts followed closely 
the secret German armoured experiments at Kazan. 39 
Tukachevsky w~s also interested in the possibilities of 
highly mobile forces, which he envisaged as a combined 
tank-air team, supplemented by parachutists and backed 
up by artillery and infantry. 40 "In general," he wrote, 
"operations in a future war will unfold as broad maneuver 
undertakings on a massive Bcale. 1141 Tukachevsky - a former 
officer of the Imperial Army - was purged in 1937. After 
that any talk of deep penetration operations with mobile 
forces was deemed counter-revolutionary. The 
'Motor/Mechanized Corps', in which Tukachevsky envisioned 
that all infantry would eventually be lorry-borne, were 
declared incompatible with the state of Soviet industrial 
development and the largely peasant soldiery at the Red 
34 
Army's disposal, and broken up. 42 
Although it developed heavy armoured forces the French 
Army did not create the autonomous, professionally manned, 
mechanized corps (the armee de metier) de Gaulle called 
43 for. In the 1920s experiments to explore the potential 
of unarmoured military vehicles were encouraged by Generals 
Edmond Buat, Chief of Staff from 1920 to 1923, Louis Maurin, 
Inspector-General of Motorization, 1927 to 1929, and Joseph 
Doumenc, who had organized motor columns to supply Verdun 
during the 1916 siege. 44 Motor transport was introduced 
45 to all arms. However, the influence after the war of 
~. 
Verdun's commander, Marshal Philippe Petain, encouraged 
the view that fixed fortifications and carefully prepared 
battlefields could blunt even an attack by tanks and that 
mobility should be thought of in terms of movement behind 
a static front, the Maginot Line. 46 The ability of General 
Maxime Weygand, Chief of Staff, 1930-31, and 
Inspector-General of the Army, 1931-35, to create a 
manoeuvre element in the 1930s was made possible by the 
mechanization of cavalry for its traditional roles of long-
range reconnaissance, pursuit, and economy-of-force 
operations. 47 Weygand's and his successor, General Maurice 
Gamelin's, light mechanised force concept encouraged 
employment of armoured infantry in semi-tracks. In practice 
these motorized dragoons moved in unarmoured, often wheeled 
vehicles - albeit usually with some all-terrain 
capability. 48 
In Germany the task formally assigned Guderian was 
that of motorizing the army's logistic system. His 
involvement in the problem of motorization, however, led 
him to consider the possibility of employing troops directly 
against an enemy in a war of movement. 49 Others, including 
Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, Commander-in-Chief 
of the Wehrmacht, 1938-41, favoured fast lightly armoured 
forces, based on mechanized infantry operating in 
. t. . h . f h . . k f 50 conJunc ion wit aircra t, as t e primary stri e orce. 
Guderian's emphasis on mechanized infantry as the integral 
infantry of an armoured division of tanks distinguishes 
his thinking. Support for Guderian may be found in Field 
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Marshal Rommel's view that: "the tank is the backbone of 
the motorised army 11 • 51 Guderian believed the tank's full 
potential as an operationally decisive weapon could be 
realised only by the formation of panzer, or tank, divisions 
which should also contain a panzergrenadier, or motorized 
tank-infantry component. The latter would contribute to 
the armoured battle by moving into the gaps created by 
the tanks, dealing with areas of opposition, and holding 
selected areas of captured ground. 52 Theoretically, he 
held, tanks would never produce their full effect until 
the troop-carrying vehicles accompanying them possessed 
equal mobility in armoured half-tracks. In practice, he 
accepted that troops accompanying tanks into battle could 
be mounted on lorries. 53 
2.3 Investigation and Influences 
Where are our two protagonists in all of this? 
In summary, in the 1920s and 1930s, Montgomery did 
not really agree with the radical and revolutionary notion 
that armour should be developed to become the predominant 
arm of the Army even though he was in touch with several 
of the advocates of this, including Liddell Hart. 
Montgomery. had written, congratulating Liddell Hart 
on his "'New Model' Army" article of 1924. In 1931, many 
of Liddell Hart's ideas were incorporated in a new edition 
of the Infantry Training Manual, written by Montgomery. 
In 1937 (when an important article of Montgomery's appeared, 
"The Problem Of The Encounter Battle As Affected By Modern 
British War Establishments") he wrote to Liddell Hart of 
the many occasions when his inspiration had come from 
Liddell Hart's writings, "which I always read with no small 
benefit. 1154 
However, though Montgomery congratutated Liddell Hart 
on his 1924 article, he did not completely agree with the 
latter's emphasis on armour. In the end, he felt, all 
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wars become a confrontation between infantry. The training 
of this infantry, its ability to move with cohesion, and 
to co-operate with artillery, tanks, engineers, and aircraft 
- what we call now the 'combined arms mix' - would determine 
SS the outcome. In Infantry Training, Montgomery conceded 
there would be cases where tanks would be employed as the 
primary arm of assault, instead of in support of the 
S6 infantry, but this was as far as he was prepared to go. 
In the article "The Problem Of The Encounter Battle" of 
1937, Montgomery put on record his views on how a successful 
commander should handle a modern major operation. A 
divisional commander must be willing to command the 
front-line units himself, to assess for himself the 
intentions of the enemy, and to dispose his forces in 
well-trained, mobile formations in accordance with a 
clear-cut plan.s 7 
What were Montgomery's views on unarmoured vehicles, 
and their strategic employment? 
Writing in the Antelope, the Regimental Journal of 
the Royal Warwickshire Regiment, he thought that modern 
conditions demand increased mobility; thus infantry should 
be provided with mechanical transport. Motorization, 
providing mobility, would permit the concentration of 
superior force at the right time and place. Mechanical 
transport would afford a commander means to move reserves 
rapidly from rear to where they would be required on the 
battle-front: "mechanical vehicles kept in suitable 
localities in rear will prove of great value for the rapid 
movement of reserves, the use of which will more than ever 
influence the battles of the future~''SB But a problem 
was wheeled vehicles' lack of an off-road capability: "one 
of the great drawbacks at present to a lorry column is 
that it cannot leave the road and scatter when attacked 
by aircraft; hence it is very vulnerable in daylight."s 9 
He proposed: "some vehicle that can leave the road when 
necessary and continue its journey across country 1160 and 
concluded that: "the semi-track vehicle must replace the 
lorry. 1161 Motorization, by increasing mobility, Montgomery 
thought in 1937, would afford a greater power to the 
37 
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attack. But, in the encounter battle - operations between 
two forces on the move suddenly making contact - unless 
enemy artillery could to a certain extent be neutralized, 
a commander could be forced to debus his forward, rifle 
units - lorry-borne light infantry - far in rear of the 
area where contact is first gained by his forward armour. 63 
In the contact battle - as contact between main forces 
becomes imminent or when following up a retreating enemy 
making use of mobile detachments for purposes of delay 
- it would be advisable to have infantry units so disposed 
that they could operate quickly and effectively against 
hostile delaying forces determined to make full use of 
obstacles. 64 This could be done by having an infantry 
brigade - two brigades, when advancing on a two-brigade 
front - in command of the forward portion of the division, 
at least two battalions of each division mobile in 
mechanical transport, 'at heel', available for use as the 
. . d 1 65 situation eve ops. 
No record has been found of any foray into authorship 
by O'Connor. A search of the inter-war volumes of the 
journal corresponding to the Antelope, The Covenanter, 
Regimental Journal of the Cameronians(Scottish Rifles), 
reveals no evidence of any contribution by O'Connor on 
66 theory. We may surmise that O'Connor was not among those 
between the wars who desired armour to become the Army's 
predominant arm even though in the first half of the 1920s 
he was Brigade-Major, 5th Brigade, an experimental combined 
arms formation. Commanding the 8th Infantry Division, 
in Egypt in the second half of the 1930s, O'Connor also 
worked closely and amicably with P.C.S. Hobart, commander 
of the Mobile Division, Egypt. A significant part of 
Hobart's training effort was concerned with techniques 
for integrating the movement of motorized infantry (the 
'Pivot Group') with the armour and artillery~ The general 
tone of O'Connor's comments and correspondence does not 
vouchsafe any evidence that he disapproved of this. "It 
is the best trained division I have ever seen," he said. 67 
O'Connor's final and retrospective view on the theoretical 
desirability of infantry accompanying tanks being tracked, 
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or at least under armour, may be gleaned from his comment 
following Operation 'Goodwood'(July 1944) that: "the 
difficulty experienced by the infantry was in keeping up 
with the tanks, which was due to the lack of a suitable 
armoured vehicle in which they could be carried forward. 1168 
2.4 Categorization and Conclusion 
It would be helpful here to try to categorize the 
different ways practitioners explored this problem of the 
relationship of motor transport to the restoration of 
mobility to operations. We may deliniate at least three 
broad categories of practitioners on the basis of their 
approaches. 
The first may be termed innovators. Rosen has suggested 
that military innovation in peacetime occurs when senior 
officers formulate some explanation, however tentative, 
of the general nature of the 'next' war and how it should 
be fought if it is to be won; technological innovation 
involves questions of what is known of the organization 
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of enemy technology. He has defined a major innovation 
as: "a change in one of the primary combat arms of a service 
in the way it fights or alternatively, as the creation 
of a new combat arm. 1170 
Exponents of the theory of armoured warfare and 
enthusiasts for the creation of large, modern tank forces, 
Fuller, Liddell Hart, Tukachevsky, de Gaulle, and Guderian 
were major innovators, if Rosen's definition is accepted. 
Nevertheless, each had something to say about the 
relationship of military transport, that is second order 
technology, to the organisation of mechanized formations 
with the capability for armoured mobility, in the notional 
succ€ssful prosecution of military operations. It should 
be emphasized, however, that they all saw tanks as the 
primary means of achieving success in such operations. 
Of course, there were differences of emphasis - to 
39 
which some reference has already been made. The stress 
which Liddell Hart, Tuckachevsky, and Guderian place on 
the need for an offensive infantry element, mounted on 
motor vehicles, to accompany the tanks to overcome and 
clear defended obstacles may be contrasted with de Gaulle's 
vagueness about this, and Fuller's view that lorried 
infantry would really only be useful to occupy captured 
ground or to operate on ground unsuited to tank movement. 
The second group may be styled progressives. These 
were thoughtful officers who perceived that movement 
utilizing the internal combustion engine was significant, 
not only for tactics but also for operational military 
strategy and needed only to be understood and brought to 
an adequate level of efficiency, workability, and mobility. 
This group may be distinguished from the innovators in 
so far as they held the tank to be only one weapon of 
mobility, rather than the potentially operationally decisive 
one under all conditions. Among these progressives we 
may include Vorosh~lov, von Brauchitsch, Weygand, Gamelin, 
O'Connor, and Montgomery. 
The third category may be termed conservatives. These 
sought to utilize the internal combustion engine as a means 
of improving the mobility of operating forces in the 
execution of attrition strategj through motorizing draught, 
to move artillery, and transport, to facilitate speedy 
deployment of infantry, and keep them, and the guns, 
supplied. What they saw no value in was the concept of 
independent armoured formations. The British Army did 
not concentrate on the innovation of large, modern, and 
independent armoured forces because of dominant 
personalities in the army's higher direction's conservatism 
in comprehending the scope and meaning of armoured warfare. 
It was qot widely understood, before the debacle of May 
1940 that, without an armoured force capable of deep 
strategic penetration and a settled cohesive doctrine of 
how the army should conduct operations with such a force, 
Britain might be at a disadvantage in any attempt to employ 
military force against Germany. What happened in practice, 
and why, is the subject of the next chapter. It can be 
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fairly stated, however, that it was and is a performance 
goal of ground forces generally - particularly the infantry 
arm - to be mobile, and in war to be more mobile than the 
enemy. The capability of moving by unarmoured or lightly 
armoured, usually wheeled, personnel-carrying vehicle gave 
the British infantry arm a workable capacity, not only 
for more rapid operational deployment but for mobility 
as well, which had the ~otential for significant operational 
strategic effects in the hands of outstanding progressive 
commanders. 
The purpose of this chapter has been to review the 
military professional literature of the period between 
the two world wars for concepts for practical applications 
of motorization to problems of movement and supply and 
for additional or alternative applications to problems 
of mobility and strategic manoeuvre by separating out the 
relevant strategic approaches of practitioners from the 
logistic ones. 
A final quotation, from the Royal United Service 
Institution Journal in 1927, may serve as a reminder that 
these approaches were worked out in peacetime, at least, 
where there was peace between the major powers, that is 
before the Second World War. There had to be a large 
measure of uncertainty about the relationship of second 
order technology to the capacity for success in future 
operations at the level of another major war: 
"The art of applying mechanized transport to the 
greatest advantage is yet unknown". It is with this 
last basic fact, and not with its more temporary 
attendant circumstances, that all armies are chiefly 
concerned. Upon a successful solution of this enigma 
in gr~at mjfSure depends the issue of future 
campaigns. 
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CHAPTER 3 
WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED 
3.1 Introduction 
Britain's inter-war failure to innovate a modern 
armoured force and an appropriate and authoritative doctrine 
of armoured warfare, to confront what may have been known 
of the organization and techniques of German armour, 
motorized infantry, aircraft and support arms in a general 
land strategy of blitzkrieg, had its nemesis in the events 
of May 1940. The mobility of tanks, panzergrenadiers and 
dive-bombers coupled to surprise and unorthodox action 
both disrupted defensive efforts and mentally dislocated 
Allied commanders. The failure to develop a final, fixed, 
organization for a mechanized division of all arms, to 
settle on a fixed and cohesive doctrine of armoured, 
mechanized, warfare, or to acquire tanks in sufficient 
numbers was critical. Yet the capability of moving by 
unarmoured or lightly armoured, usually wheeled, 
personnel-carrying vehicles gave the standard 1937-43 type 
British infantry battalion a workable capacity for mobility 
which was to have significant operational strategic effects 
in the hands of certain commanders in 1940. So, for the 
purposes of this dissertation, we need to know what the 
British Army did between the wars to review, reform and 
reorganize in respect of recognizing and rectifying 
shortcomings in reaching sufficient standards of mobility 
for the infantry. It did this by employing means of 
transport and movement which utilized the internal 
combustion engine and adapted operational concepts. 
Concepts and comment now need to be related to chronology 
to determine what the British Army did to motorize, instead 
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of developing a large, modern, armoured force. 
In Chapter 2 it became clear that the process of 
motorization took place in three functional areas: the 
transportation of supplies, the transportation of men and 
weapons to the battlefield, and the transportation of men 
and weapons on the battlefield. What actually happened 
in response to the logistic, operational and tactical 
challenges set up by motorization is established through 
an interpretive account and analysis of the participants' 
experiences of exercises and experiment to determine the 
relationship of the various orders of automotive technology 
to the capacity for success in major warfare. 
The greatest controversy in the British Army between 
the two world wars and the most contentious issue in its 
adaptation to automotive technology concerned the role 
of armoured fighting vehicles. It boiled down to whether 
tanks - military motor vehicles not only powered by the 
internal combustion engine but with characteristics of 
firepower, armoured protection and mobility and shock -
could, when independently used in an exploitation role, 
influence military operations decisively compared to mere 
support of infantry. But the British Army of 1939-40 was 
structured by its doctrine and organization more for the 
conduct of mobile, all arms operations than for armoured 
warfare. This was because it had been tacitly accepted 
that the armoured fighting vehicle would not be substituted 
for the soldier in mass, that the main formation of the 
army should continue to be the infantry division with 
mechanical transport. It was also accepted that 
motorization could increase efficiency by making the 
infantry division more mobile and self-contained. It was 
noted in Chapter 1 that, among the objective factors 
influencing British military developments between the world 
wars were the Army's responsibility to garrison the Empire 
largely to put down civil unrest, low levels of military 
expenditure coupled with inter-service rivalry for funding, 
and general uncertainty about the strategic and 
technological future. Other factors alluded to, such as 
pacifistic and idealistic governmental indifference to 
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military affairs and inability to perceive the threat from 
Japan, Italy and Germany to the collective security 
established by the League of Nations, and the military 
conservatism of dominant personalities in the War Office 
and higher command, highlight the significant - arguably 
at times decisive - influence of temperament, values, and 
perceptions of reality on the course of events. A 
description of interaction among contenders both within 
and outside the official policy-making apparatus and the 
influences of the broad categories of attitudes to 
motorization identified in Chapter 2 seeks to explain why 
the British Army did not concentrate on developing the 
modern, adequate, mechanized, armoured force of tanks with 
the armament, speed and armour to make their presence in 
tank battles decisive. 
It is worthwhile to consider how the contenders viewed 
developments: those who desired that armour be developed 
so as to become the predominant arm of the Army, and those 
more conservative contenders who wanted only "evolution, 
and not revolution" with only some tanks on the battlefield 
at the speed of advancing infantry brought to battle by 
mechanical transport. This permits evaluation of what 
actually happened in the perspective of the concepts of 
those who were writing at the time. 
Motorization influenced operations, tactics, and 
logistics. Conclusions will be formulated about the extent 
to which by 1940 British infantry had more efficiently 
achieved a capability to move more rapidly over great ranges 
to achieve operational strategic advantage. 
3.2 Exercises and Experiments 
This section is concerned with the experiments to 
replace horses by motor vehicles as means of transportation 
and operational movement and to establish the relationship 
of the various orders of automotive technology to the 
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capacity for success in future war. The conceptual context 
is Fuller's, Liddell Hart's, and other writers' and 
practitioners' promotion of the primacy of armoured fighting 
vehicles and the challenge to the British Army to adopt 
the desired doctrine and organisation. A detailed 
determination of the shortcomings of the British tanks 
intended for exploitation by engaging and defeating enemy 
tanks in independent armoured operations is largely 
irrelevant for present purposes. Remarks on their 
firepower, protection and mobility are included to 
illustrate something of the British Army's shortcomings 
in first order technology in the immediate pre-Second World 
War period, however. 
The restoration to the British Army in the 1880s of 
dragoons as mounted troops, with the capability of moving 
at the speed of heavy cavalry - the 'armour' of the day 
- but who fought on foot as infantry with the carbine, 
seems to afford an analogy with the development of motorized 
infantry in the 1930s. Furthermore, the extensive use 
by the British Army of mounted infantry in the Anglo-Boer 
War (1899-1902) suggests that it was believed that the 
concept was suited to low and medium intensity operations. 
This seems analagous to the rationalizing in the 1920s 
and 1930s that small wars were the operations suited to 
motorized infantry. While British mounted infantry of 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries -
dragoons, hussars, or yeomanry - were technical precursors 
of the British motorized or mechanized infantry of the 
Second World War period, it is recognized that care should 
be taken not to overwork the analogy. 1 
Perhaps the experimental 'light troops' of the 
Peninsular War (1808-14) and the evolution of a British 
light infantry tradition shaped the British motorized 
infantry concept more than the mounted infantry one. 2 
The light infantry tradition is associated particularly 
with the name of Sir John Moore and Frederick Augustus, 
Duke of York. The motorized infantry of the inter-war 
years sustained this tradition but, again, the links are 
superficial. 
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By the period immediately before the Second World War 
the medium tank function was regarded as consisting of 
two alternatives: some British medium tanks were viewed 
as being cruisers, intended to participate in specifically 
armoured operations; others were intended to operate only 
in support of infantry. The latter were provided with 
a howitzer as principal support armament and given extra 
armour to compensate for their slow movement. The 
only British anti-tank gun available in the late 1930s, 
the Vickers-Armstrong 2-pounder quick-firing gun was quickly 
rendered obsolete by improvements in German armour. In 
1939 and 1940, no British 'gun tanks' achieved even the 
firepower of the British heavy tanks of the 1914-18 period. 
This was not rectified until the arrival of the American 
M3 Gen~ral Grant in 1942. Although armour was increased 
and improved, cruisers still had woefully inadequate armour 
in 1939. Rivetted construction remained standard and the 
advantageous cast or welded armour was not yet in use. 
Welded construction would not only have decreased the weight 
of tanks but it could have reduced the possibility of bullet 
'splash' through slits between rivetted plates. Rivetted 
plate on frame construction determined the angular box-like 
appearance which characterised British tanks well into 
the Second World War. The late 1930s were, however, a 
turning point with respect to the speed and mobility of 
British tanks. This resulted from the development of 
cruisers with the suspension system devised by J.Wr 
Christie. This relied on large-diameter road wheels 
attached to swinging arms supported by long coil springs 
to allow individual road wheels great vertical movement. 
Nevertheless, not enough attention was yet given to 
developing suitably powerful tank engines, and British 
tanks of 1939 and 1940 were prone to great engine 
1 . b · 1 · 3 unre ia i ity. 
In 1927, some ten years after tanks' first significant 
aid to infantry on the Western Front at Cambrai and four 
years after the formation of the Royal Tank Corps (R.T.C.), 
a fully motorized force of all arms was established on 
Salisbury Plain. This experimental formation, of 
50 
approximately brigade size, to test the feasability of 
strategic reconnaissance and operations with conventional 
forces, that is, the main infantry force, existed for only 
two years. It included tanks, two-man tankettes, armoured 
cars and a machine gun battalion carried in six-wheeled 
lorries, as well as motorized artillery, ancilliary, and 
. 4 
support units. 
There was a general consensus that the trials of the 
Experimental Mechanized and Armoured Force had been a 
success but had failed to demonstrate a tactical and 
operational technique of penetration by massed tanks working 
in close cooperation with infantry, artillery and aircraft, 
as had been the case in all large-scale manoeuvres since 
the Armistice. Major A.H. Austin, R.T.C., reported in 
an interview: "And so we had to - when we were co-operating 
with the infantry on these exercises - we had to pretend 
that our maximum speed was somewhere in the region of five 
or six miles an hour and move accordingly." 5 A remark 
by General R.F.K. Belchem, R.T.C., illustrates the intense 
branch parochialism of the times: "If I can't help you 
very much in the plans, or the methods that were used to 
co-operate between infantry and tanks at that time it 
perhaps shows that I was not particularly interested." 6 
It was concluded that the motorized elements had tended 
to impede operations by the armoured elements and that 
the correct way td use armour should be 'all armoured' 
formations to which other arms and units, if motorized, 
could be attached as and when required. So trials of the 
Experimental Armoured Force were discontinued in favour 
of allowing the rest of the Army to catch up in the 
application of modern methods of transport to all arms. 7 
Those, however, wishing to see an independent force 
with the capability for armoured warfare established on 
a permanent footing were encouraged when a new permanent 
Tank Brigade under Brigadier Hobart, and the mechanized 
7th Infantry Brigade under Brigadier G.M. Lindsay, were 
briefly combined with artillery to, form another experimental 
force of all arms. Hobart and Lindsay, despite differences 
on the composition of armoured, mechanized formations, 
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combined their brigades into a 'Mobile Force' for 1934 
in an unsuccessful attempt to force the permanent formation 
of a mobile, armoured division. 8 Lord Bridgeman, then 
Brigade-Major, 7th Infantry Brigade, later remarked that 
Lindsay: 
••• could see that the task which lay ahead was to 
study the way, not so much what armour could do - he 
was not commanding armour at that moment, Hobart was 
- but how the armour could be made more effective in 
battle by the development of mechanised infantry who 
could protect them when they wanted to be protected. 
And the first thing in order to bring that about 
was to arrange for th9 infantry to be able to keep 
pace with the armour. 
The efforts of the armour enthusiasts seemed finally 
rewarded in 1937. A firm decision had been taken to form 
armoured divisions, or rather as first they were called, 
'mobile divisions'. One division was to be formed in 
Britain, another in Egypt, in response to the threat 
perceived from Italian forces in Cyrenaica. In 1939 
newly-mechanized cavalry regiments were combined with the 
RT C b tt 1 . f . 1 C lO Al h h h • • • a a ions to orm a sing e orps. t oug t e 
result may have been a 'larger' armoured force, the policy 
of cavalry mechanization was part and parcel of decisions 
not to expand the Tank Corps itself. 
Significantly for present purposes, when the concept 
of a tank-oriented mixed force was revived in the late 
1930s, the integral motorized infantry element, the Motor 
Battalions, designed to bring highly mobile infantry in 
their own vehicles in close support of the armoured 
divisions then being formed, were found from existing 
infantry units which had their antecedents in regiments 
of Light Troops commanded by Sir John Moore in the 
Penninsula. As far as armoured formations were concerned, 
infantry travelled mainly in unarmoured lorries for most 
of the Second World War. Although some later embodiments 
of the 'carrier' concept were personnel carriers, the Bren 
carrier of this period was a tracked infantry vehicle only 
in the sense that it was designed for the transport of 
the First World War infantry weapon par excellence, the 
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machine gun - albeit the latest British development in 
light machine guns - rapidly to any desired spot. It was 
unable to carry more than two or three men at a time. 
Its reputation for mechanical failure also cast doubt on 
its value to modern infantry. 
The evolution of what became the first British armoured 
divisions was, as has been shown, a long, confused process. 
The formations eventually established did not emerge as 
a result of a clear and coherent doctrine. Major-General 
H.M. Liardet, R.T.C., said in interview in later years: 
The idea was there. There's no doubt that Hobart 
had the idea of moving armoured forces on a wide front 
at high speed with the objective of going deep into 
enemy territory. This is what he meant to instil, 
not quite as much possibly in 1935 as later again when 
I came back in '36. • •• And then, of course, he was 
moved off and made director of military training. 
But certainly he had that brigade moving marvellously. 
And what is so sad is that the British Army lost all 
that. When it came to the 1939-1940 War, we hadn't 
got a proper organisation. Our armoured division wasn't 
trained as this one was and it never really functioned 
in the first part of the war. And it wasn't until 
desert days that we used armoured divisions because 
Hobart was sent out, if you remember, in 1938 or 
something of that sort to command the armoured 
division, or Mobile Division I think it was called 
t~e~, _in Eg~pt fYd got the nucleus of the 7th Armoured 
Division going. 
In fact, the cumulative influence of decisions to extend 
motorization and mechanization to include all arms and 
to experiment with the vehicular and organizational 
requirements of field forces so organized was that the 
British Army would enter the Second World War structured 
by its doctrine and organization more for the conduct of 
mobile, all arms operations than for armoured warfare. 
3.3 Influences and Events 
Few caricatures achieved the popularity with the British 
public of Low's Colonel Blimp, a proponent of 
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'Establishment' opinion who opposed the modernization of 
the British Army in the 1930s. Mention might also be of 
Noel Coward's Colonel Montmorency who "planned/in case 
the enemy tried to land/to drive them back with skill/and 
armoured force./He realized/his army should be mechanized/of 
course/but somewhere inside/experience cried:/'My Kingdom 
for a Horse"'. While there is often truth in caricature, 
the usefulness of the categories of attitudes identified 
in Chapter 2 is, perhaps, that they allow us to glimpse 
a fuller truth, and to avoid oversimplification, in respect 
of the influences of contenders on developments. 
It has been noted that innovators, exponents of the 
theory of armoured warfare and enthusiasts for the creation 
of a large, modern, tank force, wished the focus for the 
application of motorization to be the development to become 
predominant in the Army. Conservatives instead sought 
to utilize the internal combustion engine as a means of 
improving the mobility of the main conventional infantry 
force and of facilitating its cooperation with the other 
arms - including tanks - in the execution of attrition 
strategy. Progressives, it was noted, differed from the 
innovators in holding the tank to be only one weapon of 
mobility, rather than the potentially decisive. It might 
also be noted that they may be distinguished from 
conservatives by the view that the efficient application 
of automotive technology to tactics and operations demanded 
not only the replacement of horse transport by motorized 
transport but the abolition of the horse from war: for 
example, Montgomery and O'Connor - infantrymen - would 
not have been so tied 'conceptually' to the use of horses. 
Interaction took place within and outside the official 
policy-making apparatus as contenders sought to influence 
events. Colonel Sir Douglas Scott, in the 1930s a captain 
in the 3rd King's Own Hussars, recalled: "I wrote a furious 
letter to an MP friend of mine - who unfortunately passed 
it on and I got a rocket. But we just had no equipment. 1112 
Major General Liardet again, on Liddell Hart's activities 
as a military journalist, said: 
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We used to read the press accounts in the 'Times' 
and the 'Telegraph'. We used to read them avidly to 
see whether we were mentioned and whether we'd done 
well. These chaps got a very good view of what 
was going on and wrote it very well. There was no 
secrecy or anything like that at all as far as I could 
make out. I think that Liddell Hy3t was at that time 
the correspondent of the 'Times'. 
In fact, soon after being obliged to leave the army on 
health grounds, Liddell Hart became successively military 
correspondent for The Daily Telegraph (1925-35) and defence 
correspondent of The Times (1935-39). In this period, 
he probably reached the peak of his military and political 
influence, becoming unofficial advisor (1937-38) to Leslie 
Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War (1937-40). 
Throughout the inter-war period, the British Army was 
ruled by the Army Council. This body was chaired by the 
Secretary of State for War. It had four military members, 
of which the most important was the Chief of the Imperial 
General Staff (C.I.G.S.), de facto head of the Army. This 
higher direction of the Army embodied the resistance of 
a conservative military 'Establishment' to the theory of 
armoured warfare held by the innovators. Those occupying 
the office of Chief of the Imperial General Staff epitomized 
such resistance. "This little man is only 800 years out 
of date," said Fuller, of the Earl of Cavan (C.I.G.S. 
1922-26). 14 Each in turn, the innovators felt, let them 
down, disappointing any initial expectations they may have 
had of particular individuals. There is probably some 
truth in this - from the viewpoint of the tank enthusiasts. 
In terms of the categorization in Chapter 2, the 
attitudes to motorization of dominant personalities in 
the War Office and of the seven individuals who occupied 
the off ice of Chief of the Imperial General Staff between 
1918 and 1939 can be described simply as conservative. 
They were often far from antagonistic to tanks, or to 'all 
armour' formations. Most held, however, that the tank's 
fundamental role was as a weapon of infantry support. 
They felt that while armoured fighting vehicles were capable 
of highly mobile operations in conjunction with 
conventional, mechanized forces, that they were not capable 
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of making a decisive impact independently. Flowing from 
these conclusions on the relationship of the various orders 
of automotive technology to the capacity for success of 
a field force in major warfare, they argued that reform 
and reorganization directed toward the creation of a 
mechanized army .rather than an armoured force was what 
was required. It was desirable, therefore, that the 
mobility of every arm of service be improved through general 
motorization and mechanization, rather than to focus the 
application of automotive technology on establishing a 
mechanized, armoured force composed almost entirely of 
armoured fighting vehicles, as the innovators wished. 
In reality, this concept was not to be fully realized, 
despite continuation of the 1911 subsidy scheme. The scheme 
provided for a subsidy or subvention payable by the War 
Office to the civilian owner of a commercial vehicle on 
the understanding that it would be handed over to the Army 
if required. Various other arrangements with commercial 
operators for the hire of vehicles (particularly for the 
Territorial Army), and plans to impress certain civilian 
vehicles into military service were also part of the 
scheme. 
Fuller had developed his concept of armoured warfare 
around the characteristics of tanks designed by 
Lieutenant-Colonel P. Johnson. Johnson left the Army in 
the early 1920s to set up the Roadless Traction Company, 
which developed a track unit on the lines of the Kegresse 
half-track system. Almost any lorry could be converted 
to run on Roadless tracks. There were strong pleas from 
some in the Army fnr tracked or half-track transport to 
take over from wheeled vehicles, to permit greater off-road 
mobility. These were rejected, largely because it was 
felt such vehicles would not meet criteria of commercial 
viability - important because of the subsidy scheme. 
Another answer to the problem of increasing the scale 
of mobility, inspired by ideas from America, was the rigid 
six-wheeler design. An important ~nfluence in the 
. 
development of the six-wheeled load-carrying vehicle was 
Major-General M.S. Brander formerly an officer of the Royal 
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Army Service Corps, afterwards, in the period of rearmament, 
Director of Supplies and Transport at the War Office. 15 
He can be seen as representative of that large category 
of thoughtful officers who, while perhaps not thinking 
holistically, wished their own arm of service to make 
progress. In their view the concept needed only to be 
understood and brought to an adequate level of efficiency, 
workability, and mobility. 
Of course, some officers were not so much progressive, 
as pragmatic. Brigadier R.N. Harding-Newman, R.T.C., who 
assisted the mechanization of the 12th Lancers, remarked: 
What I do know is that having been one of the two 
regiments to accept mechanisation under the then Colonel 
Ch~rrington that they accepted it completely and 
utterly. And they really did their damnedest to become 
a really efficient armoured car regiment. He 
foresaw that if he accepted mechanisation early on, 
then he was going to lgntinue as the 12th Lancers but 
on a mechanised role. 
The technical problem of prov~ding a cross-country 
performance with greater carrying capacity remained, but 
as a War Office committee noted in 1934: 
By 
in 
the 
Until two or three years ago the 6-wheeler was 
regarded as the only type of 3-ton lorry suitable, 
by virtue of its cross-country performance, for military 
1st line transport work. Recently, however, a great 
improvement in the cross-country performance of 
commercial 4-wheelers has taken place. This development 
is largely the result of the classification of vehicles 
for purposes of taxation under the Finance Act, 1933, 
and the Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933, by their 
unladen weight. This classification has led commercial 
vehicle designers to produce vehicles capable of 
carrying heavy loads on the lightest possible 
chassis; this means a high power-weight ratio, which 
is precisi7Y one of the qualities required for military 
purposes. 
the mid-1930s, therefore, great advances had been made 
the design and efficiency of four-wheeled vehicles in 
3-ton range so that: "when war came again in 1939 the 
logistic transport of the Army was in a better stage of 
development than anyone who had not been concerned with 
the fight for success had a right to expect." 18 
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3.4 Contenders and Developments 
By the mid-1930s Fuller had retired from active service. 
The Ten Year Rule had ended under pressure from the 
inter-service Chiefs of Staff Committee. A deficiency 
programme had been instituted, to fill gaps in armaments 
and equipment. This was, in effect, rearmament, but with 
no commitment to send troops to Europe. As rearmament 
began, contenders who advocated a strategy of armoured 
war and wanted an elite armoured force of tanks and other 
armoured fighting vehicles as the centre of gravity of 
the army, now sought to ensure that development of the 
army's tank forces was placed at the centre of the 
deficiency and rearmament programme. As Larson puts it: 
No longer did the army or the advocates of the 
strategy of armoured war attempt to convert each other 
to their way of thinking; instead, they engaged in 
a naked struggle for control of the crucial command 
and staff positions within the army that would determine 
its future development. It began with the appointment 
of a new secretary of 19ate for war [Hore-Belisha] 
in the spring of 1937. 
This appears to be borne out by another quotation from 
Major Anthony Austin. He refers to an officer who at the 
big final discussion in the library in Aldershot Command, 
attended by the C.I.G.S. - probably General Sir Cyril 
Deverell (C.I.G.S. 1936-37), after the conclusion of the 
1937 Army Manoeuvres criticised "tanks being used in sort 
of penny packets as opposed to en masse ••• Colonel Murray 
was very outspoken and was really too outspoken about the 
way armour had been used. And I think probably at the 
end of that he got no further promotion. 1120 
The facts of what actually happened, judged by the 
concepts of the champions of armoured war, tell a sorry 
tale. The British Army did not concentrate on developing 
a tank force comparable to that of Germany, even as it 
became clear that the Government's policy of appeasement 
- trying to satisfy any German dem~nds not directly 
threatening the peace of Western Europe - would probably 
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fail, and Britain would become involved in war with a major 
power which had built its army around the offensive power 
of tanks. However, contenders who adhered to an attrition 
strategy were able to take a considerably more positive 
view of developments. 
Lieutenant-General Sir Archibald Montgomery-Massingberd 
(C.I.G.S. 1933-36) had been charged with overall supervision 
of the Armoured Force experiments of the late 1920s. His 
conclusions, later, regarding the lessons of those exercises 
were that: 
What was wanted was to use the newest weapons to 
improve the mobility and firepower of the old formations 
••• What I wanted, in brief, was evolution and not 
revolution ••• I discussed this question very fully 
with Lord Milne who was then the C.I.G.S. and as a 
result the 'Armoured Force' as such was abolished and 
a beginning was made with the mzrhanization of the 
Cavalry and Infantry Divisions. 
Implicit here is the idea that the proper, future 
operational role of medium and heavy tanks should be as 
'mobile pillboxes', that is as direct support weapons for 
the infantry, itself made more mobile by mechanical 
transport. Also implicit is the idea that the role of 
light tanks would be that of part of highly mobile motorized 
or mechanized cavalry formations to str~ke at the enemy's 
flanks or rear areas, which might also include troops 
mounted on lorries. But - in other words his view was 
that the proper employment of the new weapon did not require 
its organization in independent formations. 
When he retired in February 1936, Montgomery-Massingberd 
believed he had achieved considerable progress in Army 
reform and reorganization. Listing his achievements, he 
noted in addition to the establishment of the Tank Brigade 
as a permanent (but not operationally independent) 
formation, the decision, in principle, to establish a Mobile 
Division (although it was not actually established for 
another year), and approval in principle of the concept 
of Army-tank battalions for infantry support, the ongoing 
mechanization of cavalry regiments (the concept of purely 
motorized cavalry was abandoned shortly after he left 
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office) and considerable progress in the motorization of 
artillery and infantry transport. 22 In The Times and 
elsewhere, Liddell Hart spelled out the criticism of the 
enthusiasts for large, modern armoured forces. "The recent 
progress of the Army'', he said, "had been mainly directed 
to improving the general mobility of the other arms; this 
is rather in contrast to the latest trend abroad, where 
efforts are being made to create a number of "mechanized" 
divisions in the full sense, basicsally composed of armoured 
fighting vehicles. 1123 
According to Major-General Sir John Kennedy, Deputy 
Director of Military Operations at the War Office, 
Hore-Belisha admired Liddell Hart's writings but Liddell 
Hart's theories of strategy and tactics were anathma to 
many professional soldiers and his influence with 
24 Hore-Belisha was greatly resented. Additionally Liddell 
Hart had become compromised in the eyes of many in the 
War Office because of their perception that he was 
inextricably associated with the policy of limited liability 
regarding the comitment of the British Army to Europe. 
Liddell Hart sought to use his influence with Hore-Belisha 
to obtain for advocates of armoured warfare key staff and 
command positions within the War Office and the mobile 
divisions then being formed, writing to Hore-Belisha of: 
"the need of giving command of such new-style formations 
to men who have had experience in mechanized movement, 
and the folly of entrusting them to those who have not. 1125 
Although there was a political purge of the Army's 
higher direction in 1937, Liddell Hart's efforts to secure 
key positions for enthusiasts for the establishment of 
an independent tank force capable of deep strategic 
penetration were largely unsuccessful, perhaps because 
the politician, Hore-Belisha, did not himself fully 
comprehend the scope and meaning of armoured warfare. 
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3.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has not only been 
description, but also explanation. Dominant personalities 
in the War Office and British Army high command between 
the two world wars tended to adhere to attrition as the 
strategy most appropriate for major warfare. It was held 
that a number of factors related to the depth of the modern 
battlefield would c-0mplicate the achievement of decisive 
battle. These were that difficulties in keeping an 
attacking army supplied would increase as troops advanced 
further beyond fixed railheads and supply points and that 
an attacker could not cross the battlefield with foot-mobile 
infantry and horse-drawn guns before physical exaustion 
brought the attack to a halt. Motorization could be a 
solution. The British Army motorized to increase logistical 
efficiency, bring artillery into action closer to the centre 
of the battle and improve infantry mobility. Though this 
solution may have been flawed because of a failure to 
perceive that the army might need not only mobility but 
also the particular combination of mobility and striking 
power associated with an elite armoured force, it can be 
summarised that, by 1940, British infantry had significantly 
improved its capability to move rapidly over great ranges 
to achieve operational strategic advantage. 
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INTRODUCING THE TWO GREAT CAPTAINS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the professional careers of 
Montgomery and O'Connor up to, but not including the two 
cases dealt with in Chapter 5. It addresses each's 
experiences of active service in the First World War and 
of soldiering between the wars from a perspective of the 
development of their operational art. It attempts to 
summarise the leadership styles and command strengths which 
were to make them outstanding commanders. 
A tendency in modern scholarship is to define 'command' 
as a collaborative activity and the commander's function 
as largely managerial. Interest in generalship - the study 
of great captains and commanders - has diminshed in favour 
of studying the mechanics of command and command systems. 
A problem with such an approach is that it is often assumed 
that 'command' and 'leadership' are the same thing. It 
may be more helpful to treat them as two separate but 
related functions of 'captaincy' and it can be argued that 
both are required of those exercising military direction 
at the highest levels if an army is to function effectively 
in war. 
The hypothesis flowing from the research problem 
suggests that in war the leadership strengths of a 
commander, particularly his command skills and operational 
strategic insights can compensate for an enemy's 
technological primacy and achieve significant strategic 
advantage. The test of operations would show that Mongomery 
and O'Connor were effective leaders. They were also 
skillful commanders with the ability to understand the 
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significance of techniques of moving by unarmoured vehicle 
for operational military strategy if brought to an adequate 
level of efficiency or fighting capability. We first 
encountered Montgomery and O'Connor towards the end of 
1938 during unrest in Palestine. O'Connor was in Jerusalem 
in command of the 7th Division, Montgomery was in Haifa 
commanding the 8th Division. To further set the scene 
for understanding their command skills and their strategic 
abilities it is essential to investigate their earlier 
military experiences. Their paths had first crossed some 
thirty years earlier at the Royal Military College, 
Sandhurst. O'Connor, son of the late Major Maurice O'Connor 
of the Royal Irish Fusiliers, joined a year after 
Montgomery, the son of an Irish Anglican bishop. Neither's 
military thinking was particularly radical, revolutionary 
or unorthodox. Their principles, or methods, were rooted 
in the experience of the British Army, expressed in Field 
Service Regulations, as to what was considered essential 
to sucess at the operational level of war. 
4.2 Experiences and Development 
Montgomery's experience of the First World War began 
amidst the general retreat of the British Army from Mons 
to the Marne. He was made a companion of the Distinguished 
Service Order (D.S.O.) and badly wounded during the first 
Battle of Ypres (October-November 1914). After 
hospitalization in England he was declared unfit to return 
to France and appointed to training duties in 1915. 
However, he returned to the Western Front as Brigade-Major 
for 104th Brigade, 35th Division and was preserit at the 
Battle of the Somme (June 24-November 13 1916). Thereafter 
he held staff appointments of increasing importance in 
General Sir Herbert Plumer's Second Army. He was a staff 
officer with the 33rd Division during the battles of Arras 
and the series of battles which are known by the general 
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title of Passchendaele (April 9-15; July 31-November 10 
1917). He ended the war as a temporary lieutenant-colonel 
and Chief Staff Officer of the 47th Division. Staff and 
command appointments followed between the wars. 
When the First World War began O'Connor was a signals 
officer in 22nd Brigade, 7th Division. He was constantly 
involved in many of the major operations of 1914 and 1915 
and was one of the first recipients of the newly instituted 
award, the Military Cross. For a time he was missing during 
the Battle of Loos (September 1915). In November 1915 
he was promoted Captain and given command of the 7th 
Division's Signals Company. In 1916 he was also involved 
in the Battle of the Somme. Later that year he was promoted 
acting major and appointed Brigade-Major for 91st Brigade, 
7th Division. As Brigade-Major, 185th Brigade, 62nd 
Division he was constantly engaged in directing action 
during the 1917 Spring offensive against the series of 
German defensive zones known to the British as the 
Hindenburg Line. In June of that year, having also been 
made a companion of the D.S.O., he returned to 7th Division 
and commanded the 2/lst Battalion, the Honourable Artillery 
Company (H.A.C.) as an acting lieutenant-colonel during 
the Passchendaele Campaign. In November 1917, 7th Division 
was transferred to the Italian Front. In view of his 
successes against the Italians in 1940-41 it is ironic 
that he was awarded the Italian Silver Medal for Valour 
for leading a successful operation against superior Austrian 
forces occupying positions on the island of Grave di 
Papadopoli in the River Piave in 1918. A variety of staff 
and command appointments in Britain and overseas followed 
in the inter-war years. 
After the First World War a culture of remembrance 
evolved in Britain that was nonetheless critical of the 
war's human costs and of Britain's First World War generals. 
There was a widespread perception that they had been 
incompetant commanders who had epitomised a style of 
leadership inappropriate for the type of army which had 
come into being during the war. Montgomery's own experience 
of active service in the First World War was of great 
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importance for the development of his style of leadership 
and doctrine of command. In his Memoirs he cites three 
problems which he thought had negatively affected the 
efficiency of the British Army as a fighting machine. 1 
Senior commanders and command structures, he decided, had 
failed to rise to the challenges posed by the massive and 
rapid expansion of the pre-war professional army into a 
largely Territorial, volunteer and conscript one. He was 
appalled by the casualty rates which were such a feature 
of the British experience on the Western Front. He also 
began to reflect on the problem of how operational and 
tactical command could be effectively exercised at the 
divisional level under modern conditions. 
Certain that there would be another major war, and 
that he would exercise high command in it, he set out to 
master the science and art of commanding an army. His 
conclusions on the requirements of generalship, flowing 
from his analysis of what the First World War had revealed 
about what was wrong with the army, are to be found in 
his History Of Warfare. 2 
A commander-in-chief, he decided, has to guide, inspire 
and motivate the creation of a positive ''atmosphere" 
(Montgomery's word) throughout his command by providing 
an unambiguous overall concept of operations and making 
sure that his commanders at all levels and his troops 
understand his general intentions and what is expected 
of them. Unlike O'Connor, who had commanded the H.A.C. 
- part of the Territorial Force (from 1921, the Territorial 
Army) Montgomery had little experience of the Territorial 
Army (T.A.) until a staff appointment with the 49th (West 
Riding) T.A. Division, based in York, from 1923 to 1924. 
The relevance of his experience of training the 104th 
Brigade (part of Kitchener's volunteer army) can be assumed, 
however, in respect of the importance he attached to this 
requirement of generalship and the need for the general 
to, as Montgomery put it: "get himself over'' to his troops. 
The general has to create the fighting machine and 
forge the weapon to his own liking. Montgomery's concept 
of major operations was that which he had learned as a 
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staff officer in Plumer's Second Army: careful planning 
and meticulous preparation for operations designed to secure 
strictly limited objectives could reduce the casualty rates 
which were a feature of attrition strategy. Montgomery 
believed that casualies should be reduced to a minimum 
whenever possible. The importance of planning, training 
and morale was Montgomery's contribution to this. 
O'Connor was equally dismayed by the casualties produced 
by adherence to an attrition strategy on the Western Front. 
Kenneth Startup 3 , in his dissertation from which most later 
accounts of O'Connor's life and career have to be largely 
derived in this dissertation, says: 
O'Connor was dismayed by the losses, which he believed 
were the result of the strategic situation on the 
Western Front; a situation which virtually precluded 
the use of ''flanking" and surprise movements, and one 
which compelled officers to send their men against 
prepared defensive positions in murderous and archaic 
frontal assaults. 
After one action in April, 1917, in which the 185th Brigade 
suffered heavy losses O'Connor wrote angrily in his diary: 
"This is just the sort of thing they do in the damned Army. 
Everyone was very sorry, but that does not bring good men 
back." 4 In the Reutel-Broodseinde action at Passchendaele 
the H.A.C. also took heavy casualties. Such experiences 
led O'Connor, like Montgomery, to emphasise the importance 
of training, not only for efficiency but for minimizing 
casualties. 
A most important requirement of generalship for 
Montgomery is that the commander must create an organization 
at headquarters which enables the effective exercise of 
operational command. His experience as 'Chief of Staff' 
of the 47th Division in 1918 impressed on him the importance 
of a commander's having a good Chief of Staff and Staff. 
For Montgomery, however, the ideal was the integration 
of operational and tactical command. Therefore, a commander 
should position himself close to the fighting troops. 
At this point, some reference should be made to the 
Post-war Field Service Regulations (F.S.R.) of 1920. 
Revised between the wars in 1924, 1929 and 1935, they were 
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a sort of primer for the guidance of commanders, summarising 
the British Army's formulation of the military 'principles' 
or methods by which certain results can be attained. Among 
the most important are, firstly, the desirability of 
deciding the aim or object. Reflecting the Army's adherence 
to attrition strategy in the First World War, the 
Regulations reaffirmed that battle is the decisive factor 
in war. 5 This is substantiated by the need to act 
offensively whenever possible. There is also the need 
to ensure that all the Services and all parts of the Army 
co-operate. Next, there is the need to be mobile and to 
seek constantly to surprise the enemy in order to, finally, 
effect a concentration of greater force than the enemy 
has at the point where you intend to strike the decisive 
blow. 
These principles were often described by students at 
the Staff College, Camberley, as 'blinding glimpses of 
the obvious'. Montgomery and O'Connor completed the second 
post-war course at the Staff College in 1920-21. 
For Montgomery, a successful plan of operations required 
application of the principle of 'balance': 
My own military doctrine was based on unbalancing the 
enemy by manoeuvre while keeping well-balanced myself 
- as I have been indicating. A short title for this 
tactic would be 'off-balancing manoeuvre'. I planned 
always to make the enemy commit his reserves on a wide 
front to plug holes in his defences. Having forced 
him to do this, I then committed my reserves in a hard 
blow on a narrow front. Once I had committed my 6 
reserves, I always sought to create fresh reserves. 
In other words, the commander's plan should aim at the 
creation of an unfavourable situation for the enemy by 
manoeuvre, but allow him the flexibility to cope with things 
ranging from enemy action to accidents or incompetance 
that prevent operations from going exactly as planned. 
Once, when asked for the sources of his methods, 
O'Connor said: 
Well I think its what one's taught really I mean 
er - its the proper way to think of tactics, I mean 
the surprise is the base of all tactics and if you 
can produce a surprise on your enemy you're half way 
7 there, if not more. 
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He was well placed to comprehend the capability for 
manoeuvre provided by motorization. He spent three years 
from 1921 to 1924 as Brigade-Major for the Experimental 
Brigade, also known as the 5th Brigade. Formed when it 
was still uncertain whether mechanical transport should 
entirely replace horse transport at all and when the British 
Army was making do with a motley collection of transport 
vehicles left over from the War, its principal task was 
to run exercises testing procedures for the integration 
of infantry, tanks, artillery, and sometimes aircraft, 
and the mobility and the administration of fast-moving, 
mobile, mechanized forces. It was also involved in the 
training in new techniques of those battalions sent to 
make up the brigade, which changed every few months. Most 
important, when commanding the 7th Division in southern 
Palestine from 1936 to 1938 he used motorized columns to 
test the proposition that mixed, mechanized forces could 
provide commanders with the capacity to execute operations 
involving wide lateral movements speedily. 
Driver A. Morrison's narrative of his service as a 
driver with the R.A.S.C. in Montgomery's 8th Division area 
indicates something of the Army's capability of moving 
by lorry around 1938: 
We left the camp at seven one morning, ten three-ton 
lorries being loaded with supplies. The convoy 
consisted of two escort vehicles, one in the front 
and one at the rear, the ten lorries, an ambulance, 
a radio truck manned by two signal corps men, and an 
open lorry carrying six large donkeys which we used 
to carry §Upplies from the road to some of the 
outposts. 
O'Connor returned to the Staff College as a member 
of the Directing Staff from 1927 to 1929. Montgomery was 
also an instructor there at this time. Major-General Sir 
Frederick Maurice's book, British Strategy was based on 
lectures he delivered at the University of London and the 
Staff College between 1927 and 1929. It is perhaps 
worthwhile therefore to conclude this section with the 
9 following quotation from Maurice's penultimate chapter 
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In great or in small war mobility, surprise and a clear 
well-chosen object are the principal means of effecting 
that concentration which brings superior power to bear 
at the right time and place, and those developments 
with which we are now experimenting tend, by providing 
mobility, to help us to employ the special powers which 
we possess in the best way (emphasis mine). 
4.3 Command and Leadership 
The attempt to identify the qualities required of a 
successful commander has been a staple of military writers 
down the ages. John Keegan identifies two broad trends 
of approaches. 10 'Trait' studies take as their premise 
that those who exercise high command have certain common 
chracteristics and qualities such as energy, decisiveness 
and self-confidence. 'Behaviour' studies attempt to 
identify patterns of behaviour which distinguish leaders, 
particularly the roles of the successful leader as inspirer 
and motivator. While agreeing that certain traits and 
behaviour tend to be common to all really great commanders, 
Keegan's argument against both the 'traits' and 'behaviour' 
methods may perhaps be summarised as a criticism of their 
shared assumption that the essentials of generalship and 
high command are invariable and unchanging. A case could 
be made, for example, for his argument that since the mid 
19th century what he has described as 'heroic' leadership 
has become obsolete as far as senior commanders are 
concerned. As weapons development has driven commanders 
from the forward edge of the battlefield, the development 
of the telephone, telegraph and telecommunications have 
made more and more possible the option of commanding 
ever-larger armies from the rear. However leadership and 
high command are practised today in the Nuclear Age, Keegan 
argues that, in the past, a number of imperatives have 
combined to define 'captaincy', or military leadership 
in the higher sense. The successful leader, he suggests, 
is: "the person who has perceived command's imperatives 
and knows how to serve them 11 • 11 
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The most important of these is that the commander be 
present in person and share the risks to life and limb 
presented by the experience of battle so far as is 
compatable with allowing him to control the battle. There 
is also the requirement that commanders must know a great 
deal before they act and see what they are going to do. 
In the acronym C3I (command, control, communications and 
intelligence) often used by modern armed forces, 
'intelligence' and 'control' refer to such knowing and 
seeing. In other words, the commander has to assess the 
information from intelligence on such things as the enemy's 
whereabouts, strength, state, capabilities and intentions 
and direct its dissemination through the command system 
in the way that ensures its most effective use. These 
first two of Keegan's imperatives suggest the techniques 
of command and control demanded of the successful commander. 
The capacity not just to take decisions but to inspire, 
motivate and if necessary compel soldiers to risk their 
lives following through on them requires three 
preconditions, or further imperatives. 
Firstly, there is the imperative of kinship. The troops 
must feel that they know their commander and believe that 
he cares for and understands them. For such a bond of 
kinship to come into being the commander, in turn, must 
thoroughly understand the nature of the men he commands. 
This process can be helped if the distance between the 
commander and his subordinates, in their various grades, 
imposed by the hierarchical nature of armies, is 
occasionally penetrable by personal access either inward, 
outward, or both. More important, however, is his choice 
of subordinate commanders. Their selection and quality 
is crucial to the relationship that he manages to establish 
with those to whom his orders are transmitted. There is 
also the imperative of prescription, that is, the commander 
must know how to communicate with his troops and tap the 
power of human emotion. He must be able to convey to his 
men through words not only an impression of himself but 
also something of his plans and ambitions, so that these 
become transformed into a shared enterprise. Lastly, there 
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is the imperative of sanction. Sanction, an essential 
component of command, can be negative - in which case it 
can manifest itself as coercion and even, as a last resort, 
as physical force. It is more desirable, however, that 
this aspect of sanction remain implicit and that the force 
of sanction be made explicit as a positive, that is, as 
a system of awards and decorations. 
The remaining part of this chapter is concerned not 
so much with Montgomery's and O'Connor's interpretations 
of the principles which underlie effective command, which 
might be called their doctrines of command, nor yet with 
their views on the management of command, that is control, 
as this ought to be reflected in the command system, 
influenced as these were by their common experience of 
active service in the First World War and a shared critique 
of the military conduct of the war on the Western Front. 
Instead, it deals with some of the techniques by which 
they served the imperatives of command. In other words, 
it attempts to address how Montgomery and O'Connor 
synthesized high military command and control with 
leadership in the higher sense so as to deserve the epithet 
'Great Captains'. Because the subject of the next, final, 
substantive chapter is Montgomery's and O'Connor's strategic 
insights with respect to the effects of motorization on 
operations, it is relevant to consider how each utilized 
motor vehicles as tools or aids in the captaincy of their 
armies. 
In their practice of generalship, 'Monty' and 'Dick' 
O'Connor would manifest a determination to get away from 
what both regarded as the deficient chateau generalship 
of the Great War when, as Montgomery would write in his 
Path To Leadership: "it was rare for a senior commander 
to be seen in the forward area during a battle - a brigadier 
possibly, but not a general!'1 • 12 O'Connor's 'forward' 
headquarters in December 1940 was so small as to consist 
of only one office truck.. He would, as soon as he got 
information in, go off in his Humber staff car and see 
his commanders in the forward areas, taking only a small 
staff with him. This insistence on making visits to his 
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troops in the front line and on personal reconnaissance 
dangerously far forward would result in O'Connor's capture 
on the 6/7th April, 1941, his car having been ambushed 
by a German patrol. Nevertheless, as it summarises how 
O'Connor employed motorization to serve the imperative 
of example during his Libyian Campaign, it is helpful to 
quote the following sentance from Kenneth Startup's 
dissertation: ''O'Connor was the epitome of the front line 
commander, who is completely at ease when conducting a 
campaign from the back seat of a staff car, with only a 
small headquarters truck nearby. 1113 An important aspect 
of the process of consolidating British military 
motorization between the two world wars was the widespread 
adoption of staff or command cars for the purposes of 
providing an environment in which senior officers could 
study paperwork and maps and converse on the move. The 
most ubiquitous of the bigger British staff cars of the 
Second World War period was the SS-horsepower Humber 'Snipe' 
Mk. 2, in either Saloon, Tourer, or Heavy Utility versions. 
Although O'Connor's Humber was most probably a heavy utility 
version, the tourer is probably the best known version 
due to Montgomery's use of a number of these vehicles during 
the war. The point, however, is that both can fairly be 
said to have expanded the conventional understanding of 
why a car was provided for senior officers. 
Equally aware of the importance of intelligence and 
control as prerequisites for effective military action, 
both O'Connor and Montgomery attempted to harness 
motorization, not always with unqualified success, to solve 
the problem of acquiring 'real time' intelligence and 
putting it to immediate use. As explained, for Montgomery 
the ideal was the integration of operational and tactical 
command, so a commander should position himself close to 
the fighting troops. In his 'Encounter Battle' articles 
of 1937 and 1938 he had advocated this for the modern 
divisional commander. Between 1942 and 1945, he would 
seek to make it the cornerstone of his system for 
controlling ever-larger formations, eventually by splitting 
his headquarters into three parts, Tactical, Main and Rear, 
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and placing himself at the small and mobile 'Tac HQ' well 
forward in the battle area. The feas~bility of controlling 
armoured and mechanized formations by voice communication 
from a command vehicle had been demonstrated as early as 
the 'Mechanized Force' manoeuvres of 1927 and 1928. 
O'Connor had trained as a signals officer. Nigel Hamilton 
narrates that the 'hub' of Tac [8th]Army was the armoured 
command vehicle which housed the small operations staff 
with radio operators and their sets from which it was 
possible to keep communications open with Main HQ and to 
all Corps HQs. 14 This was probably an A.E.C. Mk. 1 
'Dorchester' which was built on the chassis of the A.E.C. 
'Matador' gun tractor. However, the majority of command 
vehicles at the centre of Montgomery's Tac HQ during the 
war would have been lorries fitted with wooden 'house' 
(or office) bodies based on the Bedford QL chassis. One 
of the roughly thirty to forty vehicles which might make 
up Tac HQ at any one time was Montgomery's office caravan. 
By coincidence, this had been built for the famous Italian 
General, Barba Elettrica ('Electric Beard') Bergonzoli 
- only to be captured by O'Connor's forces and remounted 
on a Leyland 'Retriever' chassis. Thus, whether it was 
O'Connor in his Humber, carefully observing and noting 
the topography upon which his army would operate and 
visiting his subordinate commanders to make operational 
decisions immediately and personally, or Montgomery, who 
based his technique of operational control on a mobile 
tactical headquarters with good communications, each 
harnessed motorization in significant ways to serve the 
imperative of action. 
Their experience of active service on the Western Front 
in the First World War gave Montgomery and O'Connor a 
thorough understanding of the ordinary, intelligent and 
often fundamentally unmilitary servicemen they commanded 
between 1939 and 1945 who had been plucked from civilian 
life to become warriors. In the First World War, O'Connor 
and Montgomery had experienced the remoteness of the High 
Command. They therefore knew the importance of 'command 
recognition', that is, the degree to which the ordinary 
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soldier knew his superior officers. They made personal 
contact with their troops whenever they could. Direct 
contact is, however, not always possible. A device to 
overcome this problem of recognition at a remove that was 
particularly Monty's was his adoption of peculiar headgear 
combined with, an eccentric form of dress, which made him 
instantly recognizable even at a distance. While Montgomery 
and O'Connor would always express complete confidence in 
their soldiers' fighting spirit, their men knew that their 
commanders were determined not to get them unnecessarily 
killed or entrust them to incompetent superiors. This 
mutual confidence further strengthened the bonds of kinship 
between Montgomery and O'Connor and the troops they 
commanded. 
Montgomery and O'Connor were, however, very different 
types of men. Montgomery was wiry, opinionated and when 
he thought it was necessary could be something of a showman~ 
He had remarkable theatrical gifts and a talent for 
self-presentation which he used to serve the imperative 
of prescription by addressing large gatherings of troops. 
He also quickly realised the importance of the national 
press and the army's own press organs for communicating 
with - and motivating - the soldiers he commanded. O'Connor 
was slight, diffident and with a manner of self-presentation 
and prescription which, while gaining him the complete 
confidence of his men, was always low-keyed. This can 
be illustrated with the following story recounted to this 
writer: 15 
Men have fond memories of him. One, a Rifleman and 
P.O.W. of the Japanese told me that on his release 
he met O'Connor in India. The General invited him 
to tea at his house and as he had no proper Cameronian 
uniform, gave the ex-P.O.W. his own (the General's) 
Cameronian Balmoral." 
Finally, Montgomery's and O'Connor's frequent employment 
of the traditional positive sanction of decoration was 
a factor which enabled them to preserve such a remarkably 
high degree of morale in their formations, in spite of 
often acutely uncomfortable campaigning conditions, that 
79 
the full force of negative sanction must rarely have had 
to become explicit. As will be noted again in the next 
chapter, however, Montgomery was ruthless in attempting 
to exercise the negative sanction of dismissal in the case 
of officers he thought incompetent. 
4.4 Summary and Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to appraise the 
leadership strengths and command skills of Montgomery and 
O'Connor from a perspective of how they understood and 
served certain crucial requirements of high military command 
and leadership in the higher sense and to assess the 
relevance of their earlier military experiences for the 
insights into motorization which they would demonstrate 
in 1940. 
It can be concluded that neither Montgomery's or 
O'Connor's approach to the art of commanding and leading 
an army in the field was particularly radical, revolutionary 
or unorthodox except with respect to risk. Their 
principles, or methods, were rooted in the experience of 
the British Army, expressed in Field Service Regulations, 
as to what was considered essential to success at the 
operational level of war. Their experiences of active 
service on the Western Front in the First World War, 
however, left both critical of the way leadership and 
command had been exercised and operations planned and 
conducted, and each was determined to improve this in their 
appointments and commands between the two world wars. 
Existing command structures substantiated the notion that 
forward presence was incompatable with effective operational 
direction, that is with senior commanders' responsibility 
for controlling the battle as a whole. The First World 
War had demonstrated, however, that this absence of forward 
presence by senior commanders had produced a military 
situation in which command and control tended to become 
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separated. Put another way, tactics in the First World 
War were developed at lower unit levels, and became 
separated from the operational thinking of general 
headquarters. Armies had simply become too large for senior 
commanders, however elaborate their information-gathering 
means, to grasp where the opportunity for outcome lay. 
Montgomery and O'Connor were among those thoughtful, 
progressive officers convinced that a particularly important 
technological innovation which could reintegrate command 
and control by restoring vertical communication through 
the command hierarchy of an army reorganized for open, 
mobile warfare was the improvements in radio and wireless 
communication with which the British Army was experimenting. 
Their additional contribution to a solution to the problem 
of operational command was a perception that the full 
potential of techniques of automotive movement for forms 
of manoeuvre at the operational level, according to the 
latest British war establishments, would sometimes require 
the commander's forward presence if speed, surprise, 
flexibility and ingenuity were to be allowed their full 
rein. This would be dependent upon the availability and 
use of appropriate technology in the form of suitably 
powered staff cars and operational command vehicles with 
good communications. 
It was explained that the growth of mass armies in 
the 19th and early 20th centuries made personal leadership 
by generals increasingly difficult, yet the heroic 
expectations of the leader persisted. Montgomery's and 
O'Connor's perception, however, that advances in 
communication and transportation between the two world 
wars had begun to make it possible for the commander to 
be able to leave his headquarters and move rapidly around 
his command, while remaining in contact with his staff 
had the further consequence of recreating the senior 
commander as personal leader. Very conscious that they 
were leaders of the army of a democracy in a people's war, 
O'Connor, but particularly Montgomery, attempted this 
limited form of heroic leadership in the Second World War 
so successfully for the purpose of establishing a common 
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bond with the ordinary, intelligent and often fundamentally 
unmilitary "warriors for the working day (Shakespeare: 
Henry V)" they commanded, that they deserve the epithet, 
"Great Captains". 
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CHAPTER 5 
MONTGOMERY AND O'CONNOR: THE TWO CASES 
5.1 Introduction 
At the end of the last summer of peace, a few days 
before the outbreak of the Second World War, Montgomery 
took command of the 3rd Division, British Expeditionary 
Force (B.E.F.). Similarly, a few days before Italy's 
declaration of war on Britain in June 1940, O'Connor took 
command of the Western Desert Force in Egypt. This chapter 
contains descriptions of the principal features of the 
opposing plans for operations in North-Western Europe and 
North Africa as envisioned by these.two commanders, both 
faced as they were with enemies with superior armaments. 
The chapter goes on to explain, compare and contrast how 
they coped with the problems of compensating for inferiority 
with initiative and original thought in the utilization 
of the second order armaments at their disposal. The 
chapter does not purport to be a continuous narrative of 
events nor a comprehensive account of the Battles for France 
and North Africa. It does, however, aim to be coherent 
and complete as far as the operations which constitute 
the applications of motorization are concerned. This will 
require reference to general developments in the course 
of these campaigns. 
In the first case, the Allies were faced with a sudden, 
unorthodox stroke which benefitted from surprise in time 
and space, requ~ring a response to save British forces. 
Thus, this chapter is concerned with the operational 
strategic consequences of Montgomery's application of 
techniques of motorized movement to effect the simultaneous 
and sequential actions conducted by his 3rd British Division 
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subsequent to the cracking of the Belgian line on 26th 
May 1940, until 3rd Division's withdrawal into the the 
Dunkirk perimeter on 29/30th May. It explains the 
contribution of his application of motorization to the 
extrication of the B.E.F. from the disadvantageous, 
apparently untenable situation in which it found itself 
after its manoeuvre into Belgium. 
In the second case, the stroke was against the Axis 
forces in the Western Desert. This chapter is thus also 
concerned with O'Connor's application of procedures of 
motorized movement to deploy a force ahead of his limited 
armoured force in a blocking position across the coastal 
road south of Benghazi on 4/Sth February 1941 to prevent 
the withdrawal of the Italian 10th Army and particularly 
its remaining armoured elements from Cyrenaica into 
Tripolitania ordered on 28th January. An application of 
the high mobility of motorized means of movement, the 
success of this manoeuvre contributed directly to the 
envelopment and final destruction of General Valentino 
Babini's armoured brigade, creating such an untenable 
situation for the Italians that Beda Fomm might be called 
a complete victory. 
5.2 Plans and Preparations 
The Allied plan for North-Western Europe - the 
Dyle-Breda Plan or Plan 'D' - derived from the French High 
Command anticipating the decisive point of enemy attack 
to come in the north, through Belgium in a repetition of 
the German operation in 1914. It was devised to counter 
such a stroke. It envisaged a continuous defensive line 
running through eastern Belgium, with one flank innundated 
and the other protected by the Maginot Line. Behind the 
Dyle river barrier, French, Belgian and British forces 
would be systematically disposed in considerable depth. 
In accordance with Plan 'D', the B.E.F. took up positions 
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along the Dyle, east of Brussels, from Louvain to Wavre. 
The German operational plan, Plan Yellow, in its final 
form, the 'Sichelschnitt'manoeuvre, was an application 
of the general strategy of Blitzkrieg. The French border 
defences of the Maginot Line would be outflanked using 
von Bock's Army Group 'B', advancing through Holland into 
Belgium to draw the most mobile part of the Allied forces 
northward to its front. In the meantime the main German 
armoured and motorized forces, Panzer Groups Kleist and 
Hoth of von Rundstdedt's Army Group 'A' debouched quickly 
through the Ardennes forest on a frontage between Dinapt 
and Sedan and effected crossings of the Meuse with the 
object of achieving deep strategic penetration, cutting 
the communications of the Allied armies advancing into 
Belgium. 
Montgomery had used the first winter of the war to 
train his division, not only for a move forward to occupy 
a defensive position in accordance with the plan to advance 
into Belgium but also for a withdrawal which might require 
a long, rapid, motorized movement of the division by night, 
in contact with the enemy. The following quotation 
explains his thinking: 
The 3rd Division certainly put that first winter to 
good use and trained hard. If the Belgians were 
attacked, we were to move forward and occupy a sector 
astride Louvain behind the River Dyle. I trained the 
division for this task over a similar distance moving 
westwards, i.e., backwards into France. We became 
expert at a long night move, and then occupying a 
defensive position in the dark, and by dawn being fully 
deployed and in all respects ready to receive attack 1 This is what I felt we might have to do; and it was. 
In the ensuing months of the 'phoney' war Montgomery 
devised some five large-scale exercises with troops and 
his division became proficient in rapid movement in 
motorized transport. For present purposes Exercise Number 
3 (early March 1940) is important. It involved continuous 
operations for forty-eight hours, in two definite phases. 
The first phase involved a night advance from the divisional 
area to secure before daylight a river obstacle some sixty 
miles distant. The second involved contact with enemy 
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armoured forces, disengagement by night from close contact, 
a fighting withdrawal to a position in rear and the 
organisation of that position for defence. 2 
These exercises were followed by divisional conferences. 
Montgomery explained what he thought had gone right and 
what he thought had gone wrong. He was ruthless in 
attempting to get rid of officers he thought 'useless'. 
'Useless' was a word he used easily about those who irked 
him. On the other hand, he began to gather around him 
some of those he would later appoint to key positions in 
his Tactical H.Q. after he had split his headquarters into 
the three parts of Tactical, Main and Rear. 
In the Western Desert, O'Connor's initial concern was 
with strengthening the defences of the area around Mersa 
Matruh, which was being prepared as the main base for future 
operations. To conserve his armour for future major 
operations it was concentrated south and south-west of 
Matruh. There it would be well sited to attack the southern 
flank of the Italian Army if an invasion was launched along 
the coast road. However, raiding took place through the 
'Wire' - a fence put up by the Italians to mark the frontier 
- and offensive patrolling with armoured cars and 
lorry-borne infantry. Though called after 
Lieutenant-Colonel J.C. Campbell V.C. the credit for 
integrating the concept of these 'Jock' columns with 
tactical thinking and their development into a tactical 
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system was largely O'Connor's. Composed of a regular 
company of motorized infantry and either a troop or a 
battery of field artillery, employed to harass the enemy, 
to support the armoured cars in keeping contact with him, 
and to keep him from divining British intentions, the small, 
mobile, motorized Jock Columns must be distinguished from 
the many small-scale, irregular British units used for 
raiding, reconnaissance and sabotage. Nevertheless, they 
were then, and are now, viewed as a controvrsial 
development. 
Creagh, commanding 7th Armoured Division, reviewing 
the operations of the Jock Columns in a letter to O'Connor 
of 25th September 1940, wrote: 
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One way and another we have now been operating 
for some four months and the machines and I include 
the wheels are definitely feeling the strain. We cannot 
get vehicle replacements and the difficulty I am 
confronted with is that if we expend our all too few 
assets on this type of operation we shall aot be 
efficient when it comes to the main fight. 
Writing in 1986, Field Marshal Lord Carver felt that the 
success of these columns: 
led to an exagerated idea of the effect their action 
would have on a more resolute and better trained enemy; 
and discouraged the development of a closer co-operation 
between the tanks of the armoured division, concentrated 
in its armoured brigades, and its artillery and 5 infantry, grouped together in the Support Group. 
Having advanced into Egypt, the Italians did not 
continue towards Matruh but stopped some twelve miles beyond 
Sidi Barrani and began to construct a series of strongly 
fortified camps on a perimeter starting at El Maktila on 
the sea and then following an arc in a south-westerly 
direction to Bir Sofafi, about forty miles away, then back 
to the coast along the rocky and hilly escarpment between 
Sofafi and Sollum. O'Connor recounts the genesis of 
'Compass' in an account of his campaign which he wrote 
as a prisoner of war. The following quotation makes it 
clear that, although Wavell's concept for Operation Compass 
was the limited one of a major raid on the Italian positions 
in the triangle Sidi Barrani-Sofafi-Buqbuq to deter any 
further advance and preserve Egypt as a base for future 
British operations in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
South-Eastern Europe, O'Connor's planning could allow for 
the possibility of subsequent exploitation should the 
opportunity arise; also that in preparing the operation 
O'Connor was aware that he would have to contend with the 
problem of how he would move his army and keep it supplied: 
I felt that as the enemy had refused to come 
forward, he must be attacked in his present positions. 
The same conclusion had been reached by General 
Wavell who wrote to General Wilson [Commander, British 
Troops in Egypt] with a copy to myself, instructing 
him to examine the possibility of offensive operations 
limited to five days, with the object of striking the 
enemy in his present positions. The possibility of 
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exploiting local success was also emphasised. But 
neither then or at any other time was an ultimate 
objective given. In effect the operations were to 
be in the nature of a big raid which if successful 
was to be exploited, as fas as our ~ea~re 
administrative resources would permit. 
Wavell's instructions included suggstions in 
considerable detail as to the operational strategies which 
might be employed, not all of which entirely satisfied 
O'Connor. O'Connor summarised his own plan as follows, 
in an interview recorded at the Imperial War Museum long 
after the war: 
It was essential to my mind that we make some plan 
that would throw them off their balance and prevent 
them getting full advantage from the large numbers; 
large superiority of the numbers. And we were helped 
in this by the form of defence that they adopted which 
was - consisted of a number of - er - camps - strongly 
fortified, but, and here we'll see weakness; they were 
out of supporting distance of each other, and we 
therefore made up our minds that we'd take advantage 
of that and try and be with them individually. We 
therefore decided that we'd attack one particular camp 
and to make that attack more effective, we moved our 
troops round between two of the camps ••• so that we 
could attack them from the rear - in fact the way 7heir 
rations would come, which perhaps wasn't quite so. 
O'Connor's plan, then, was to avoid the casualties which 
might be incurred in a frontal assault on the strongly 
fortified Sofafi positions on or below the escarpment where, 
anyway, the terrain did not favour the employment of tanks 
and lorry-borne infantry; instead, his plan was to surprise 
the Italians by passing through a gap identified in their 
defensive line at Bir Enba, and take the enemy camps in 
detail from the rear. O'Connor drew on his experiences 
of the benefits of proper and adequate training and the 
rehearsal of operations and had the various units taking 
part practise the last portion of the long, secret, 
motorized approach by night he required and rehearse the 
tactics to be employed. 
O'Connor's plan for 'Compass' was for a tri-service 
operation, involving three simultaneous and sequential 
movements of land forces designed to cut off and destroy 
the Italian bridgehead in Egypt. The series of fortified 
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'boxes' in the Western Desert north of the Enba 'gap' and 
the Sofafi group of camps would be successively reduced 
from the rear using fifty Infantry (Matilda 2) tanks of 
the 7th Royal Tank Regiment with the infantry of the 4th 
Indian Division following up behind. The 7th Armoured 
Division would turn south from Enba for its motorized 
Support Group to strike at, or at least contain, Rabia 
and Sofafi while the division's two armoured brigades sealed 
off the entire area northward to Buqbuq. In the north, 
a mainly infantry force of roughly brigade strength drawn 
from the Matruh garrison would advance along the coast 
road toward Maktila and Sidi Barrani. 
An overriding consideration throughout would be the 
administrative restriction imposed by O'Connor's need to 
simultaneously move his force and keep it supplied, even 
when the leading troops were at the extremities of support. 
It can be learnt from the papers of Major-General (then 
Major) C.M. Smith R.A.S.C. that the only administrative 
arrangements it was possible to make beforehand without 
arousing suspicion was to establish two widely dispersed, 
camouflaged and guarded forward supply dumps of all types 
of supplies in the open desert between the British and 
Italian armies. 8 To summarise, one can do no better than 
to quote Corelli Barnett, who said of O'Connor that: "he 
was the first desert general, British or German, to try 
to square the circle of finding enough trucks to feed, 
and move, the forward operations; the first to learn that 
victory depended on the three-tonner. 119 
The repulse of a large British raid on Maktila in 
October encouraged the Italians' belief that well and 
logically constructed static defenses were proof against 
direct British attack from their southern and eastern desert 
flanks and that therefore it would not be necessary for 
significant manoeuvre forces to parallel through the desert 
any advance along the coast. The Italian strategic 
intention, then, was an advance with semi-motorized, mainly 
infantry forces the sixty miles around the coast to Mersa 
Matruh, as a further stage in their advance on the Suez 
Canal. The campaign would be timed to take advantage of 
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cooler Winter temperatures, but its exact timing would 
be contingent on a vast infusion of material, especially 
transport vehicles. 
In her diary entry for 16th September 1940 the Countess 
of Ranfurly (whose husband would be one of those captured 
with O'Connor the following April) referred to the Italian 
invasion of Egypt. She noted, apprehensively: "People 
say that the Italians have 300,000 troops in Cyrenaica 
and we have 30,000. They also say the Italians are better 
equipped than us." 10 On 10th May, Montgomery had begun 
a day-to-day diary with the following terse entry: 
Enemy aircraft over Lesquin. 
Belgium and Holland invaded 11 Plan D put into force - zero 1400 hrs. 
5.3 "Pergola of Fire": Flanders, 27/28 May, 1940 
"We're standing on the Franco-Belgian frontier watching 
long columns of British troops and transports and supplies 
and guns coming through from France into Belgium," Bernard 
Stubbs reported for the B.B.C. on the 13th May 1940. 12 
Already, the forward body of Montgomery's 3rd Division 
was on the Dyle. However, Belgium's strategy for defence 
against German attack - evolved independently of the 'Dyle' 
plan because of Belgium's neutrality until 10th May - had 
been undermined. The country's initial line of defence 
along the Albert Canal had been breached by German airborne 
attack. The bulk of the Belgian Army was in headlong 
retreat to a line east of Brussels, which was in fact, 
the Allies' 'Dyle' line, which they were now reinforcing. 
On Whit Monday, 13th May, the day Montgomery's division 
assumed the defence of Louvain, Guderian's tanks crossed 
the river Meuse in France, at Sedan, and Rommel, whose 
troops had achieved the first crossing the previous evening, 
near Dinant on the Belgian Meuse, established a solid 
bridgehead across the river. The French reaction may 
perhaps be summarised as a series of attempts to contain 
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rather than to counter-attack the German lodgements across 
the Meuse while these were still without significant tank 
support. The crucial moment passed. Guderian swung right, 
making for the Channel coast. A panzer 'corridor' was 
created, splitting the Allied front in two. The Allied 
High Command failed to recognize the full measure of the 
danger posed by the German massed armoured and mechanized 
drive. By Thursday, the 16th, however, the threats of 
encirclement, then destruction, which now hung over the 
French 1st Army Group, the B.E.F., and the Belgian Army 
had become more and more obvious to Lord Gort, the B.E.F. 's 
commander. 
Although the light tanks and carriers of its armoured 
reconnaissance regiment were forced to retire from the 
approaches to Louvain, 3rd Division managed to conduct 
a spirited, successful defence of the town itself, with 
close fire-support provided by the divisional machine gun 
battalion and concentration fire by the division's medium 
and field artillery. In often confused, close-quarter 
fighting, the enemy was forced to withdraw from lodgements 
established across the Dyle canal. Notwithstanding 
Montgomery's division's success in repulsing repeated German 
attempts to break into the Dyle Line, a staged withdrawal 
of the B.E.F. was decided upon, which would commence with 
a move back to the River Dendre and conclude with a 
retirement to the River Escaut, or Scheldt. Thus, only 
two months after training his division for a withdrawal 
of some sixty miles by day or night from a defended line 
under enemy attack, Montgomery was ordered to disengage 
his division and withdraw it that distance through Brussels 
to the Escaut. 
The withdrawal was not an easy one. The 3rd Division's 
route of retirement was badly exposed from the north, 
subject to air attack and crowded with refugee traffic. 
Brooke ordered a brigade of II Corps' 4th Division to 
protect this northern flank. By dusk on the 16th, the 
bulk of the 3rd Division was successfully withdrawing to 
the Dendre. Brooke intended the 3rd Division to provide 
a defensive screen for 4th Division as it, in turn, retired 
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to the Dendre on the 17/18th after sappers had blown the 
Brussels canal bridges. The 4th Division's retirement 
was somewhat messy, however, and part of the corps cavalry 
screening its withdrawal was cut off on the 18th and almost 
totally destroyed. The bulk of 4th Division having 
withdrawn through 3rd Division to the Escaut, and having 
delayed the enemy on the Dendre for twenty-four hours, 
Montgomery was now ordered to disengage his div~sion and 
withdraw it behind the Escaut. The hour for the 
commencement of this withdrawal was originally dusk on 
the 18th but this was altered to midday on the 19th and 
then dawn on the 19th to conform with the precipitate 
withdrawal of I Corps. Thus, Montgomery was forced to 
execute the final stage of withdrawal to the Escaut in 
daylight, which, he conceded, made this: "a very tricky 
operation 11 • 13 By the evening of the 19th the whole of 
3rd Division was behind the Escaut and forming part of 
a new front. It was responsible for the stretch of the 
river between Avelgem and Pecq. On the 20th a German 
attempt to bring forward bridging equipment and reinforce 
a temporary lodgement which had been made across the river 
was abandoned. The enemy withdrew after being engaged 
with machine guns and artillery. The following day further 
attacks developed and determined attempts to get across 
the river, this time in rubber boats. With artillery and 
machine gun support, these attacks were broken up before 
the enemy could cross the river or before he could land. 
Events to the south were becoming ever more threatening, 
however, the arc of the German advance from the hills and 
forests of the Ardennes to Abbeville, near the mouth of 
the Somme cutting through a disorganized French resistance 
and completely traversing the B.E.F. 's Lines of 
Communication. 
A defence of the B.E.F. 's south-west front and exposed 
right, or southern, flank was now attempted with improvised 
forces. A British spoiling attack was launched on the 
21st toward Arras, which was considered central to the 
defence of this southern flank. Political expediency 
required Gort to agree to ~n offensive into the panzer 
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corridor, in conjunction with the French. There would 
be an offensive from north and south, starting not before 
the 26th. 
Anxious as he was to re-establish operational contact 
between the B.E.F. and the French armies to the south of 
the panzer corridor, Gort was extremely doubtful as to 
whether these French armies could or would mount an attack 
northwards sufficiently powerful for the proposed offensive 
to have any chance of success. The extended nature of 
his front, the situation on his flanks, and a chaotic 
administrative situation were other factors which influenced 
him to sanction important members of his staff raising 
with the War Office the possibil~ty of withdrawal on one 
of the Channel ports, probably Dunkirk. 
A retirement of the B.E.F. from the Escaut, ostensibly 
to re-occupy the 'Gort Line' defenses which it had 
constructed along the Franco-Belgian frontier the previous 
winter was decided upon, the Belgians conforming with this 
move by withdrawing to the River Lys. Gort did not confide 
to his allies his near certainty that the planned 
counter-attack from north and south could not result in 
his force breaking out southwards and that the parts of 
the B.E.F. under his immediate command would have to 
withdraw on Dunkirk. 
During the night of 22/23rd May, Montgomery withdrew 
his division to a position west of the French frontier 
near Roubaix. Units started thinning out after dark, with 
the bulk of units in position along their new line early 
on the morning of the 23rd. Reference must now be made 
to the operation known as the Wattrelos Counter-Attack 
which Montgomery ordered mounted while 3rd Division was 
in the Gort Line, the conception, planning, and execution 
of which remain controversial. Much of the criticism of 
this operation, which has since been described variously 
as a 'counter-attack', 'reconnaissance in force', or 'raid', 
has centered on the attempt to stretch the capabilities 
of carriers in counter-penetration and withdrawal operations 
to a capability to lead a head-on assault in this operation, 
as if they were tanks. At this time, also, Montgomery 
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personally presented the ribbons of decorations to those 
honoured in the first list of awards for this campaign. 
An encounter between a 3rd Division patrol working 
across the Lys and a German staff car resulted in the 
capture of documents including details of a German plan 
to outflank the B.E.F. from the northeast by attacking 
the Belgian line in overwhelming strength between Ypres 
and Comines and penetrating through it to the B.E.F. 's 
left rear, while a simultaneous holding attack prevented 
the B.E.F. extending its left flank to restore the broken 
Belgian line. Meanwhile, the Luftwaffe would render the 
last French Channel port available to the B.E.F. - Dunkirk 
- untenable for the evacuation of any British forces which 
managed to escape being outflanked and destroyed. The 
German armour north-east of the B.E.F. would now merely 
hold the British right between La Basee and the sea, and 
so be conserved for future operations in the south. (In 
fact, the panzers would shortly resume their eastward 
drive). On Saturday, 25th May, Gort decided, finally, 
that attempting to save his army was a higher responsibility 
than serving the ends of Inter-Allied solidarity by 
remaining committed to the scheme for a break-out to the 
south assisted by a French offensive northwards and 
transfered to Brooke the bulk of the forces scheduled to 
take part in it to help Brooke try to hold the line facing 
eastwards and to extend its flank north-westwards. While 
the B.E.F. withdrew on Dunkirk, the troops would be embarked 
to fight another day and guns, vehicles and stores 
abandoned. 
Brooke now began to use his additional forces to extend 
his flank to block the German advance on the Ypres-Comines 
Canal. He related that, on the 27th: 
I proceeded to Bondues to see Monty at 3rd Division 
as I wanted to find out how he was getting on with 
the preparation for the very difficult move that lay 
ahead of him. He had to evacuate his present positiori 
and lead his division under cover of darkness across 
the Lys just east of Armenti~res, past Ploegsteert 
Wood, and up by second-class roads north-ward within 
4,000 yards of the fluctuating front of the 5th 
Division, to north of Ypres, where he was to prolong 
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our eastern defensive flank north of the 50th Division. 
It was a task that might well have shaken the stoutest 
of hearts, but for Monty it might just have been a 
glorious picnic. He told me exactly how he was goiy~ 
to do it, and was as usual exuberant in confidence. 
Montgomery closed the gap which had opened between 
50th Division and the Belgians by moving the main body 
of his division that night twenty-five miles, by means 
of some 2000 vehicles within a couple of thousand yards 
of the front on which 4th, 5th and 50th divisions were 
being heavily pressed by the enemy and which could give 
way at any moment, to take up an unreconnoitered position 
on the Yser Canal north of Ypres, being fully deployed 
by dawn (morn~ng brought the news that King Leopold of 
the Belgians had surrendered with his army), and in all 
respects ready to receive attack. Montgomery thought it 
was: "the most difficult operation we had to do'1 • 15 ''All 
unit M.T., Sup. Coy. M.T. and some Gunner M.T. to be used 
for transport of personnel," stated the 3rd Division's 
War Diary. 16 The 8th Brigade, which comprised a battalion 
of Suffolks, a battalion of the East Yorkshire Regiment 
and a battalion of the Royal Berkshires, and the 9th 
Brigade, comprising the 2nd Battalion of the Lincolnshire 
Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the King's Own Scottish 
Borderers and the 2nd Battalion of the Royal Ulster Rifles, 
withdrew first, thinning out drastically after dusk. The 
7th Guards Brigade, comprising two battalions of Grenadier 
Guards and one of Coldstreams, covered the withdrawal, 
and finally abandoned the position at one minute to 
midnight. Brooke later wrote: 
There was little possibility of sleep that night, 
as the 3rd Division was moving past and I repeatedly 
went out to see how they were progressing. They were 
travelling, as we had so frequently practised for our 
night moves, with lights out and each driver watching 
the rear of the vehicle in front of him, which had 
the differential painted white and lit up by a tail-lamp 
under the vehicle. The 3rd Division through constant 
practice had become most proficient at this method 
of movement. However, with the congestion on the roads, 
road-blocks outside villages, and many other blocks 
caused by refugees and their carts, the division was 
frequently brought to a standstill. The whole movement 
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seemed unbearably slow; the hours of darkness were 
slipping by; should daylight arrive with the road 
crammed with vehicles the casualties from bombing might 
well have been disasterous. 
Our own guns were firing from the vicinity of Mount 
Kemme!, whilst the German artillery was answering back, 
and the division was literally trundling slowely along 
in the darkness down a pergola of artillery fire, and 
within some 4000 yards of a battle-front which had 
been fluctuating all day somewhat to our disadvantage. 
It was an eere sight which I shall never forget. Before 
dawn came, the last vehicles had disappeared northwards 
into the darkness, and I lay down for a few hours 
disturbed sleep 17 but kept wondering how the 3rd Division 
was progressing (emphasis mine). 
After Montgomery's important, successful flanking 
movement past the front of attack to take up his new 
position and his organization of a scratch force of machine 
gunners and armoured cars on the morning of the 28th May 
to screen his left flank from Noordschote to the coast 
which was uncovered due to the Belgian surrender, the 3rd 
Division made a further and far from simple retirement 
after its defence of the Yser canal with 50th Division 
on the perimeter of the Dunkirk bridgehead on the 29/30th 
May, the divisional sector being along the Nieuport-Furnes 
Canal north-east and south-west of Furnes. 
5.4 "Get to the Coast": Cyrenaica, 4/5 February, 1941 
In the Western Desert of Egypt O'Connor's forces were 
successful in overcoming the camps which made up the 
Italians' forward defences. In a matter of days, the 
Italians had been driven completely from Egypt. Generally, 
the heavily armoured Matildas were able to gain rapid access 
to the center of each camp and silence the Italian artillery 
while the infantry of the 4th Indian Division carried in 
their immediate wake by trucks and lorries debussed to 
engage the Italian infantry around their machine gun pits 
and among trenches, tents and parked vehicles. 
Nevertheless, the initial failures of a direct attack and 
a flank attack by British infantry mounted on trucks against 
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the Sidi Barrani position, not authorized by O'Connor, 
demonstrated the limitations of motorized infantry against 
prepared defences and well directed artillery fire, when 
unsupported by armour. Despite learning that the 4th Indian 
Division, less its British infantry brigade, was to be 
withdrawn from his command and sent to the Sudan, O'Connor 
was determined to press his offensive forward and advance 
into Cyrenaica. Sustained efforts by the efficient and 
well trained Italian artillery and the sporadic and less 
efficient intervention of the Regia Aeornautica slowed 
his attacking columns, however, and facilitated the 
withdrawal of substantial enemy forces on the port of 
Bardia. 
Bardia was a much more formidable defensive position 
than the camps had been. Its defences included extensive 
minefields, a wide anti-tank ditch and two lines of 
fortified posts behind deep barbed wire. The Matildas 
would need a way prepared for them through the minefields 
and across the anti-tank ditch. This task was to be 
undertaken by infantry of the 6th Australian Division, 
recently arrived to replace the Indian Division. Only 
one squadron of the Australians' own divisional cavalry 
would be available, and it would fight with carriers and 
machine guns mounted on trucks. A generally difficult 
administrative situation was at least partly relieved by 
stripping the 7th Australian Division (still in the Delta) 
of its transport, partly by the arrival (from Palestine) 
of some 50 heavy lorries and their crews and partly by 
pressing captured Italian vehicles into service. On 3rd 
January, 1941 the Australians struck at the Bardia defences 
from the west and south. The second day of the battle 
ended with the town itself captured, but with a strong 
enemy position still remaining in the south-east. A 
successful 'set-piece' attack with the infantry supported 
by tanks and artillery was put in against this position 
the following morning. Even before the fight for Bardia 
had ended O'Connor had sent a column in the direction of 
Tobruk. 
As the defences of Tobruk replicated those of Bardia, 
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O'Connor's overall plan for its assault closely resembled 
that for Bardia. After sappers and infantry had broken 
into the south-eastern defences the breach would be widened 
by more infantry supported by tanks and then the penetration 
deepened towards the town itself. The capture of El Adem 
airfield to the south of Tobruk deprived the garrison of 
any possibility of significant air support. Tobruk was 
assauted in the early hours of 21st January and captured 
the next day. To complete his conquest of Cyrenaica it 
remained for O'Connor to take the port of Benghazi. More 
importantly, if the Italian forces in Cyrenaica were to 
be destroyed once and for all, he had to maintain his 
offensive. To the west, some 40,000 Italian troops, 
supported by the Babini Armoured Brigade, held a series 
of positions along a line, Derna-Mechili. 
The 7th Armoured Division invested Mechili, the key 
to the Benghazi bulge, or promontory, but was not able 
to prevent Babini's escape north-westwards. The 6th 
Australian Division pressed along the coast toward Derna, 
but the Italians used the difficult terrain to fight an 
infantry delaying action with considerable skill, allowing 
the garrison to withdraw westwards. On 3rd February, from 
aerial reconnaissance and reports of a sudden slackening 
of resistance to the western movement of the Australians 
after their capture of Derna, O'Connor correctly surmised 
that the Italians were about to abandon Benghazi (in fact 
Marshal Graziani had ordered the total evacuation of 
Cyrenaica the previous day) and to retreat down the coast 
where the route from Cyrenaica into Tripolitania goes 
through a narrow bottleneck between sea and mountains. 
In Tripolitania, a new and viable armoured force was being 
assembled around the Ariete Armoured Division, newly arrived 
from Italy. There was even a possibility that a German 
force could soon reach Tripoli. O'Connor decided that 
the object of his campaign would be forfeited if enemy 
armour was allowed to escape into Tripolitania. He was 
determined that the retreating Italians should not reach 
Tripoli. 
What O'Connor intended was nothing less than an 
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immediate 150-mile advance of the 7th Armoured Division 
from Mechili across the desert flank of the fleeing Italians 
to intercept their retreat by cutting the coast road. 
"There was", wrote the journalist, Alan Moorhead, "only 
one order of the day: 'Get to the coast'". 18 This advance 
began at daybreak, 4th February, 1941. The frightful nature 
of the 'going' is conveyed by Rogge: 
Navigating by hand compass and ·standing up in their 
trucks to see, the officers nearly froze to death as 
the long lines of tanks, armoured cars, Bren gun 
carriers, trucks, guns and ambulances ground 
relentlessly on. For miles and miles across the 
terrible terrain that even the Bedouin seldom crossed, 
their speed rarelr 9 rose above 5 or 6 miles per hour. But they made it. 
O'Connor followed in his staff car. That afternoon, Msus 
was reached and cleared of a small Italian force. The 
pilot of a Hurricane on reconnaissance now inaccurately 
reported that the Italian armoured force was part of a 
column already moving south from Benghazi. A special, 
fast-moving British column of wheeled vehicles only, 
consisting of armoured cars of the 11th Hussars and the 
King's Dragoon Guards, a battalion of motorized infantry 
from the Support Group in the form of the 2nd Battalion, 
The Rifle Brigade, a battery of 25-pounder field guns of 
the 4th Royal Horse ArtilLery and some anti-tank guns of 
the 106th Royal Horse Artillery (Lancashire Yeomanry) was 
rapidly organized, placed under Lieutenant-Colonel John 
Combe and called Combeforce. Its orders were to cut the 
coast road as soon as possible, following a revised, more 
southerly axis of advance, and hold the enemy until the 
armour could arrive. This force moved off just before 
sunrise on 5th February. Macksey offers the following 
graphic description of Combeforce's progress across the 
desert hinterland south of the Benghazi promontory to the 
Gulf of Sirte: 
Ahead went their old armoured cars; behind, jolting 
across undulating desert, came the trucks and lorries 
of the Rifle Brigade and then the guns, swinging 
rhythmically at the tail of their prime movers and 
limbers. Through driving dust - visible from miles 
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away to individual Italian aircraft swooping low for 
scattered attacks - vehicle commanders struggled 250 find an accurate course across uncharted ground. 
In a classic, just-in-the-nick-of-time deployment 
to bring the enemy to battle, Combeforce reached the coast 
road and blocked it in the vicinity of Beda Fomm before 
the appearance of a seemingly endless Italian column in 
the early afternoon. "To this force," O'Connor wrote, 
"belongs the main credit for bringing about and making 
possible the successful battle which followed. 1121 The 
attrition battle of Beda Fomm, which was t-0 last nearly 
two days and result in a complete victory for the British 
and Commonwealth forces, had begun. 
5.5 Recapitulation 
The purpose of this chapter has been a substantial 
development of the theme of how O'Connor's and Montgomery's 
init~ative and th-0ughtful use of the second order armaments 
at their disposal resulted in one case in the destruction 
of a major Axis force and in the other in the deliverance 
of significant British forces from equally sure destruction. 
The units which had originally evolved the British 'motor 
battalion' doctrine were inappropriately committed during 
the battle for France and virtually destroyed in the siege 
of Calais in May-June 1940. However, an important feature 
of both of the operations described in this chapter was 
the contrasting employment of the troop-carrying capability 
of means of transport and movement utilizing the internal 
combustion engine - mainly unarmoured lorries and cars 
- to achieve significant strategic advantage without tanks 
or at most with limited tank support. The two strokes of 
intelligent operational art described in this chapter 
permitted the two commanders not only to maximize the 
effectiveness of scarce armoured and semi-armoured assets 
but to bring to an adequate level of efficiency in mobile 
operations motorized infantry as the nucleus of a mixed 
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force in the absence of a viable armoured force. Both 
the applications of motorization described in the chapter 
demonstrate that it is possible for a commander to use 
mainly second order technology to achieve the capacity 
for success in operations against an enemy which has 
seemingly decisive technological advantages. In other 
words, they provide evidence that satisfies the demands 
of the hypothesis for this study and answers subproblem 
one. 
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
The British war poet, Keith Douglas, in a poem of 1941 
wonders if time would show him ''of the world deserving 
mention or charitable oblivion~"l Montgomery's and 
O'Connor's conduct of the operations selected is noteworthy, 
it is suggested, particularly for the evi~ence they provide 
that under certain circumstances a commander may win through 
with mainly second order technology and armaments against 
an enemy with numerical and technological superiority. 
That the response which saved the B.E.F~ in May 1940, 
allowing it to successfully withdraw to the sea at Dunkirk, 
rested in substantial measure on the Army's capability 
of moving by unarmoured vehicle was not lost on the British 
leader, Winston Churchill. He suggests in his history 
of the Second World War that it represented: "one of those 
rare but decisive moments when mechanical transport 
exercises its rights. 112 It can be argued that this also 
holds good for the Western Desert Force's race to get to 
the coast at Beda Fomm. Underlying the success of these 
operations was both commanders' employment of an adequate 
troop-carrying capacity to enhance their operational 
strategic capabilities. Indeed, it is clear from Chapter 
5 that there were a large number of similarities between 
the two cases. There were also important differences, 
or dissimilarities. The purpose of the present chapter 
is an analytical restatement of the many similarities, 
with the significance of the most important dissimilarities 
carefully noted, leading to an explanation of how Montgomery 
and O'Connor gained their advantages. 
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6.2 Montgomery's and O'Connor's Conduct Of Operations 
Analysed 
A common feature of Montgomery's and O'Connor's conduct 
of the operations selected, rooted in their individual 
experiences of active service in the First World War, was 
their conscious attempt to embody or represent a style 
of leadership and command different from that which they 
believed had negatively affected the British Army's 
efficiency in that war. While convinced that a good Staff 
was vital, they practiced parity of esteem with the staff 
officer for regimental officers and absolute impartiality 
as to whether or not an officer was a Regular or serving 
only for the duration of 'hostilities'. Both could be 
ruthless with any officer they thought incompetent, however. 
More important was their concern with processes of positive 
bonding between higher commander and ordinary soldiers, 
of which their forward presence on the battlefield is a 
most important example~ They contended that the effective 
control of the ebb and flow of a battle, particularly the 
capacity to put information from intelligence to immediate 
use on any vulnerability of the enemy to flanking and 
surprise movements (that is to the application of manoeuvre 
principles, an antidote to the attritional approach to 
warfare) also required that a commander should position 
himself close to the fighting troops - substantiated in 
their own forward presence. 
Their insights into the relationship of motorization 
to their forces' fighting potentials lay in their 
understanding of the solutions it could offer to problems 
of integrating command and control. It permitted them to 
leave their headquarters to move rapidly around their 
commands, allowing their troops to feel that they knew 
'their' commander and giving their subordinate commanders 
firm guidance and a clear lead. Most importantly and above 
all it lay in their understanding that improvements in 
the troop-carrying capabilities of mechanical transport 
helped them as they might ·have put it themselves, 
105 
paraphrasing (the quotation from) General Sir Frederick 
Maurice (in Chapter 4), to employ the special powers which 
they possessed in the best way. Today, we might wish to 
use more modern terminology, to say that they realized 
that the availability of mobility gave the commander of 
a force of limited offensive power a capacity to act 
strategically to out-manoeuvre an enemy with an apparently 
decisive technological advantage and/or superiority in 
armaments. 
Recently, many modern forces similarly affected by 
inferiority/superiority issues, such as the U,S. Marine 
Corps (which would expect to fight under numerical and 
environmental inferiority conditions) have incorporated 
manoeuvre principles into their doctrines. Doctrines of 
manoeuvre warfare aim at breaking the cohesion of an enemy's 
forces. According to the manoeuvre approach, achievement 
of strategic advantage, so that the enemy's ability to 
fight as an effective organized force is reduced, is a 
more essential. aim than the imposition through superior 
force of such loss of personnel and equipment on the enemy 
that he can no longer fight. This relates directly to 
inferiority/superiority issues for the suggestion that 
in operations conducted according to manoeuvre principles 
results can be achieved disproportionate to the effort 
of force employed, provided only that such force is employed 
to best effect. O'Connor's 130-mile stab over physically 
hostile terrain, across the Italian communications, 
epitomized the application at the operational level of 
war of what we today call the deep thrust. If successful, 
an operation of this type, directed at the linkages within 
and between an enemy's combat, combat support and combat 
service support organizations, can decimate his fighting 
and support forces. But Montgomery's 25-mile manoeuvre 
past the front of enemy attack to take up a new position 
demonstrated that even a determined attempt at an 
armour/infantry deep thrust and encirclement can be parried 
under conditions which permit a commander to exploit the 
inherent capablity of mixed mechanized forces for fast 
deployment. Thus, factors of time, space and scale may 
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be so compressed that vital strategic advantages can be 
obtained. The leading Slovakian manoeuvrist, Colonel Svec 
contends that the only constant dimension in war is relative 
time. 3 At the centre of the manoeuvre approach to warfare 
is the issue of relative time and the notion of getting 
inside the enemy's decision-making cycle or 'OODA Loop'. 
This term comes from the need to Observe, Orientate, Decide 
and Act more swiftly than one's opponent~ 
A related concept, expressed in modern military 
terminology as 'Command and Control Warfare (C2W)', involves 
the idea of def eating an enemy by using a German command 
style known as Auftragstaktik under the name of 'mission 
command' as a tool to decentralize command and control 
so as to put the enemy command system on 'the horns of 
dilemmas' in a decision-making cycle. At all levels of 
the command and control system decentralized by 
Auftragstaktik the successful prosecution of manoeuvre 
warfare requires risk-taking decision-makers who can 
recognize fleeting opportunities and act decisively upon 
them. High regard for Montgomery's calibre as a commander 
by his immediate superior, Brooke, and a similar 
appreciation of O'Connor's abilities by his ultimate 
superior, Wavell, meant that Brooke and Wavell were content 
to set the broad objectives, then allow Montgomery and 
O'Connor use their initiative to fulfil them in the way 
they thought best, based on their insights into the 
strategic uses of second order technology and armaments. 
We learn from Brooke's own account that when he visited 
Montgomery's headquarters on 27th May 1940 to outline the 
part he envisioned for Montgomery in his plan to save the 
B.E.F. Montgomery told him exactly how he was going to 
achieve his part of the plan. Similarly, even though Wavell 
had his own clear views on the strategy for 'Compass' he 
was soon prepared to let O'Connor follow his own plan. 
This is .!!.2J:. to suggest that the British system of command 
then was generally decentalized, according to today's 
British Army's version of Auftragstaktik; it was often 
unwieldy, burocratic and inflexible, in other words poorly 
suited for carrying out manoeuvre warfare. (Several 
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historians, in fact, have suggested that later on Montgomery 
himself, as Commander, 21st Army Group, placed such 
stringent restrictions on O'Connor in his command of VIII 
Corps, 2nd Army, 21st Army Group, that O'Connor was unable 
to exploit the fleeting opportunity for a breakthrough 
during the 'Goodwood' battle in July 1944). The premise 
of the Wehrmacht's Auftragstaktik command style that 
commanders would know what action to take, without detailed 
orders, was vindicated during its successful practice of 
manoeuvre warfare in May 1940, particularly by Guderian's 
and Rommel's actions in establishing control of the west 
bank of the Meuse. The Italian Army in Libya, however, 
was characterised by an inflexible, authoritarian form 
of 'top-down' command, exercised in the case of senior 
officers from headquarters well to the reat, which severely 
circumscribed its ability to practice high mobility and 
manoeuvre. 
Montgomery anticipated that the main German attack 
might be by armoured divisions and that the French and 
Belgian armies could crack. He was alarmed by the lack 
of contingency planning for a response to save the B.E.F., 
but alert to the probability that his division would have 
to execute a series of essentially defensive manoeuvres 
involving moving back from contact with the enemy. He 
trained 3rd Division accordingly, rehearsing his troops 
in their likely roles. Because of his emphasis on keeping 
options open (his principle of 'balance'), however, in 
his forward planning he also allowed for the possibility 
of engaging the enemy in mobile, delaying warfare if and 
when the enemy became vulnerable to 'Encounter Battle' 
tactics, in which the mobility provided by motor vehicles 
would be a vital factor, permitting the concentration of 
superior force at the right time and place. 
Montgomery began to establish his greatness as a field 
commander during the British Army's Flanders Campaign of 
1940. His conduct as a divisional commander merits study 
because of 3rd Division's night move in the middle of the 
northern break-through battle, on the night of 27th May, 
which saved II Corps and the B.E.F. from being outflanked. 
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This was a difficult and delicate operation involving the 
organization of a 'delaying' rearguard force to mask the 
division's withdrawal, the execution of an incremental 
reduction of a defended perimeter by dusk, under fire, 
a night flanking move by means of mechanical transport 
past the front of enemy attack and the occupation of a 
new position before dawn. 
His conduct of his division also deserves consideration, 
however, because of his ability to preserve in fluid, mobile 
warfare the initiative in defence throughout the campaign. 
In a succession of brilliant defensive actions from the 
Dyle river to the Dunkirk perimeter Montgomery substantiated 
his concept of using infantry with a sufficiency of 
designated and divisional wheeled motorized transport to 
carry out a variety of tasks, with mechanized semi-armoured 
infantry in carriers playing the role of supporting armour. 
Acting together they operated as the nucleus of a successful 
mixed force without tanks, or at most with the occasional 
limited support of some light tanks from the divisional 
armoured mobile cavalry screen. 
In the Western Desert of Egypt and Cyrenaica the 
westward extension of the operational area brought to an 
end not only the Italian occupation of Egypt but the near 
collapse of the Italians' hold on Libya and appeared to 
have opened the prospect of a virtually unimpeded advance 
towards Tripoli and their expulsion from North Africa. 
This extension was consequent on O'Connor developing his 
offensive operations from a large-scale raid initiated 
by a probe into a gap in the enemy defences, into a 
successful offensive involving long-range pursuit, deep 
thrust and envelopment. 
Post-war writing and scholarship has devoted 
considerable attention to O'Connor's use of tanks and it 
is tempting to seek to reconcile the pattern of O'Connor's 
campaign, particularly his use of tanks, with Fuller's 
concept of 'strategic paralysis' - using the 
armour-protected mobility and firepower of tanks and their 
capacity for shock-action to demoralize, disorganize and 
destroy the enemy's command system - or making it fit with 
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Liddell Hart's concept of 'armoured mobility' and Strategy 
of Indirect Approach. The British Army's v~ew in 1941 
was that the success of O'Connor's campaign validated 
official pre-war concepts of the uses of tanks and the 
organization of armour, and the role of infantry and the 
way they should fight in the armoured battle. According 
to this 'Of£icial' view, infantry tanks, with extra armour 
to compensate for their slow movement, had supported a 
succession of attacks by infantry on foot, but carried 
to where they had to assault the enemy in mechanical 
transport, while lightly armoured cruisers and light tanks 
had conducted a series of wide-ranging out-flanking 
movements to prevent the intervention of Italian armour, 
preceeded and covered by armoured cars. However, O'Connor's 
use of tanks in the British Army's First Libyan Campaign 
was pragmatic and can best be typified as progressive in 
terms of the categories of attitudes to motorization 
developed in this dissertation. His manner of employing 
armour was simply the best way he could devise to use those 
armoured assets he had most effectively in conjunction 
with his conventional forces, to improve the efficiency 
of his force as a whole in the execution of his offensive. 
Although he did not relegate the tank to a role purely 
as a weapon of infantry support neither did he use tanks 
independently in an exploitation role to influence 
operations decisively. 
In fact, a particularly interesting feature of his 
campaign was the use he made of a new type of offensive 
grouping: mixed mobile columns consisting of the dedicated 
motor infantry of the armoured divisions' Support Groups 
and conventional infantry with sufficient soft-skinned 
vehicles for movement (when captured vehicles were 
included), towed artillery and light armoured vehicles 
but no tanks. The artillery and armoured vehicles 
(carriers, armoured cars) provided fire-support and 
generally played the role of supporting armour. These 
columns proved effective under the prevailing conditions 
of an enemy tied to static defences. They kept the 
initiative for O'Connor, inflicted casualties and disruption 
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quite out of proportion to their actual, limited fighting 
power and, as at Beda Fomm, were able to move rapidly over 
great ranges to achieve operational strategic advantage 
initially without tanks - although tanks were decisive 
in relieving frontal and flank pressure on Combeforce in 
the later stages of the battle, as the Italians sought 
to use their tanks to reopen their retreat route. The 
fact remains, however, that the tank-balance at Beda Fomm 
was overwhelmingly in the Italians' favour in numerical 
terms. The Italian armoured force also included large 
numbers of the Carro. Assaulto Tipo M13/40 ("Tank, Type 
M13/40". M for Medio - Medium, the first number for the 
weight in tons, the second for the. year of introduction), 
an adequate tank by the standards of 1940 and almost as 
good as the German PzKpfw III Ausf E (the usual abbreviation 
of Panzerkampfwagen which translates literally as "Armoured 
Fighting Vehicle". Ausf, short for Ausfl1hrung - Mark, 
with the different marks written as letters of the 
alphabet), the major weapon of the armoured divisions used 
in the conquest of France. Over a hundred of these Italian 
tanks were destroyed or captured at Beda Fomm. 
In a war of manoeuvre, bold advances could be offset 
by well-managed retreats, and, as the operations selected 
show, can compensate for an enemy's technological primacy 
and achieve significant strategic advantage~ Apart from 
the fact that O'Connor's manoeuvre operations were conducted 
as part of the offensive which developed from his 
large-scale raid and that Montgomery's manoeuvre was 
executed as part of an essentially defensive operational 
strategy of fighting withdrawal, there were other 
differences between the two cases and it is important to 
note them. Notwithstanding the facts that his division 
had been placed on half rations since 22nd May and that 
by now there was a serious shortage of artillery ammunition 
(both consequences of the fact that the B.E.F. was now 
cut off from its main Line of Communication), adequate 
transport contributed in no small measure to the success 
of Montgomery's manoeuvre. This adequacy was achieved by 
the inclusion of formation transport. Techniques of road 
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movement were carefully practised and military police and 
sappers were able to mark and keep open the route. 
O'Connor, however, had to impose a dual mandate on the 
mechanical transport at his disposal and use it not only 
for the speedy movement of infantry over great distances 
across difficult terrain so that they could keep in contact 
with the retreating enemy, but also to keep his whole force 
(including his armour) supplied and avoid problems of 
logistical breakdown. He was compelled, in other words, 
to cope with problems which Fuller, Liddell Hart, and other 
writers and practitioners promoting the primacy of tanks 
intended to participate in armoured, independent, mobile 
operations far and wide behind the enemy lines had largely 
tended to gloss over: problems of how the tanks got there 
and what was liable to happen on the way, that is, keeping 
tanks supplied with fuel and mechanically fit. This 
practical logistic problem was exacerbated by a shortage 
of the specialized equipment that enabled armoured forces 
to move economically in the desert such as tank-
transporters: tractor-trailer combinations for the recovery 
and transport of tanks. (These were to remain in short 
supply in the British Army until the arrival of the American 
Diamond T tractor in 1941). The first interesting feature 
of O'Connor's solution to his logistic problems was his 
system of Field Supply Depots (F.S.D.s), which increased 
the number of supply dumps of all types of supplies along 
his axes of advance from the two established before 
'Compass' to a total of some fourteen. (This system of 
maintenance was expanded henceforward for British and 
Commonwealth forces' desert operations, the F.S.D.s becoming 
Field Maintenance Centres (F.M.C.s)). Another feature 
was his organization of large numbers of captured medium 
and heavy lorries into new supply units. 
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6.3 Conclusion 
Combined with their dynamic leadership, Montgomery's 
and O'Connor's insight that the policy to motorize the 
British Army's transport, which gave the '1937-1943' type 
of infantry battalion a capability for far-ranging mobility, 
had implications for operational strategy which enabled 
them to achieve strategic advantages with second order 
technology during the British Army's Flanders and First 
Libyan Campaigns of 1940-41, despite their enemies' 
technological primacy. This needed only to be understood 
and brought to an adequate level of efficiency, The 
analysis of Montgomery's and O'Connor's conduct of the 
operations selected from these campaigns suggests that 
an explanation of how they gained their advantages is that 
each was able to find a workable strategy to apply their 
limited offensive strength to best effect, through 
manoeuvre, employing their transport and communications 
to achieve the required mobility and operational strategic 
flexibility. Using the art of concentration and dispersion 
of forces as a means of achieving advantages 
disproportionate to their offensive strength by local 
superiority (and, in Montgomery's case, security by timely 
withdrawal) they were able to turn their relative 
technological weaknesses into relative strengths. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
It has been widely held, and for obvious reasons, 
that the British Army's defeat in north-west Europe in 
the summer of 1940 at the hands of the German Army was 
hardly offset by its victories over the Italian Army in 
the winter of 1940-41. The reasons for the British Army's 
failures in the early years of the Second World War are 
many and complex and not always clear. Traditionally, 
they have been held to include inferior generalship and 
inadequate equipment. Underlying these problems, according 
to this view, was many superior officers' inability to 
fully comprehend the scope and meaning of armoured warfare. 
This resulted in the British Army's lack of a modern 
armoured force in 1940. 
Yes, Britain, the country which had invented the tank 
went to war in 1939 without a single effective armoured 
division or a coherent doctrine of armoured warfare. Thus, 
the British Army was in a position of relative inferiority 
in first order technology in comparison to the German Army. 
But by the outbreak of the Second World War Britain 
possessed the only totally motorized army in the world, 
superior to any other in its depth and breadth. Every 
arm of service and support was equipped with means of 
transport and movement utilizing the internal combustion 
engine, with no dependence whatsoever on horses for 
transportation~ This was completely unlike the German 
Army. The principal means of operational movement of most 
German soldiers in 1939 continued to be their feet. 
Furthermore, the German Army still used animals to draw 
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a large part of its logistics and artillery. 
In any consideration of the way in which changes wrought 
by the military technology of those years changed the way 
in which warfare was to take place on land, one particular 
feature immediately becomes apparent. This is that the 
development of means of movement utilizing the internal 
combustion petrol engine increased the basic speed of land 
warfare. Fourie suggests that this change was significant 
not only for tactics but also for operational military 
strategy. It needed only to be understood and brought 
to an adequate level of efficiency (see Chapter 1). This 
research sought to test the performance of the British 
Army of 1940 in terms of that proposition, relying on an 
hypothesis that the leadership strengths of a commander, 
particularly his command skills and operational strategic 
insights, can enable strategic advantages to be gained 
with second order technology notwithstanding an enemy's 
technological superiority. What was found was that 
effective responses ~ possible with available 
combinations of technology in spite of the British Army's 
inferiority in first order technology, given conceptual 
superiority at that level of strategy at which concept 
and implementation meet and where the optimal has to be 
adjusted to the possible in the light of technical 
limitations, which is called Operations. Given, that is, 
able, forward thinking, progressive commanders. Richard 
O'Connor and Bernard Montgomery were two such commanders. 
7.2 Summary and Conclusions 
In the period between the wars some military thinkers 
and soldiers wanting to modernize the British Army had 
written of a strategic revolution the development of 
armoured warfare had wrought. In future major warfare, 
they contended, a large modern armoured force used in 
independent mobile operations could deliver decisisve 
115 
victories without the casualty rates associated with 
attrition strategy in Europe in the previous world conflict. 
There was an expectation, therefore, among these writers 
and soldiers that armour should be developed so as to become 
the predominant arm of the army. Because of a variety 
of problems such as a lack of resources caused by the 
economic situation, governmental indifference to military 
affairs and the conservatism of superior officers, the 
'official' view was that the British army should not 
concentrate on establishing the armoured force for which 
the 'modernists' hoped~ Indeed Britain, where the tank 
had been invented the tank and armoured warfare pioneered, 
lost the tank advantage it had had, Worse still, it fell 
behind Russia, France and Germany where armour capable 
of deep strategic penetration was developed. However, 
for various reasons, including a desire to improve the 
mobility of the traditional arms and to increase their 
logistic efficiency, the decision was taken to motorize 
the entire British Army to include each arm of service. 
Thus the British Army went to war in 1939 with the 
capability of moving by motor vehicle that gave it a 
notional capacity to compensate for its shortcomings in 
armour. The problem then, was to consider the relationship 
of various orders of technology to successful prosecution 
of military operations and to consider whether reliance 
on second order technology would have been feasible or 
whether it inevitably spelt disaster as in Poland. Evidence 
from the British Army's Flanders and First Libyan Campaigns 
of 1940-41 suggested that it was possible for commanders 
to be successful with second order technology against 
enemies with apparently decisive first order technological 
advantages. The research problem could thus be boiled 
down to two questions. Does technological primacy in the 
hands of an enemy make defeat inevitable or is it possible 
for a commander to use second order technology to overcome 
the apparent consequences of being deficient in armaments? 
If so, what conditions would enable the commander to gain 
advantage over his technologically superior enemy? 
At the begining of this dissertation a lack of any 
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official .British consideration of a strategic role at the 
level of major warfare for mechanical transport additional 
or alternative to its uses in the movement of men, guns 
and supplies was identified. Indeed, such theory as there 
was clearly supported the view that the lack of an armoured 
force comparable to that of Germany would place the British 
Army in a dangerous and critical position in the event 
of war. It was, therefore, considered necessary to take 
this study further, to review the military professional 
writings of the inter-war period to determ~ne what the 
literature revealed of theoretical concepts for the 
strategic employment of second order technology and to 
compare it to the approaches of practitioners. To provide 
a theoretical basis for the examination of the data used 
in this research the writings were analysed in terms of 
writers' concepts of notional uses of motorized transport 
for the strategic movement of forces in the manner that 
certain commanders in military history have used the 
railways. Finally, the various approaches were synthesized 
in terms of three broad categories so that one could see 
the different writers' approaches to establishing the 
strategic employment of motorized transport. British 
military thought between the wars was apparently dominated 
by the British military commentators, J.F.C. Fuller and 
B.H. Liddell Hart, but the debate on armour in Britain 
was paralleled in Russia, France and Germany. There 
important contenders for the innovation of modern tank 
forces were Marshal Mikail Tuchachevsky, General Charles 
deGaulle and General Heinz Guderian. Few of these 
'innovators' considered that there could be any satisfactory 
substitute for the tank and a large modern tank force. 
Another category, 'the conservatives', included many of 
Britain's senior soldiers. They saw no value in the concept 
of independent armoured formations. They expected also 
that the role of mechanical transport would remain primarily 
the movement and sustenance of operating forces in the 
execution of attrition strategy. A third category, 'the 
progressives', was distinguished. They differed from the 
innovators in that they held the tank to be only an 
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important weapon rather than the decisive one. While the 
conservatives saw mechanical transport simply in the 
logistic sense without realising that it had the potential 
for strategic movement of forces, progressives - and 
Montgomery and O'Connor were two progressive practitioners 
of great importance - realized that motorized transportation 
had a deeper strategic significance. They understood that 
the availability of motorized mobility gave them not just 
the capacity to carry troops and supplies but the capability 
to act strategically, that is, it gave operational strategic 
flexibility. 
The British Army did not respond to the innovators' 
promotion of the primacy of the tank and all that that 
implied. A second step in this research was to establish 
the extent to which the Army motorized. This required an 
interpretive account and analysis of participants' 
experiences of field exercises and experiment to replace 
horses by motor vehicles as means of transportation and 
movement and to determine the relationship of various orders 
of automotive technology to success in war. In the late 
1920s the British Army set up the world's first mechanized 
force for independent operations. This was not an 
independent armoured force. It was a mixed force composed 
not only of tanks, but also of motorized infantry and 
artillery, with air support, to test infantry-artillery 
-armour co-operation. This force lasted for just two years, 
until it was concluded that the motorized elements had 
tended to impede operations by armoured elements and that 
the correct use of armour should be 'all armoured' 
formations to which other arms and units could be attached 
as and when required, if their mobility was improved. 
Complete motorization could be a solution to problems of 
mobility in three functional areas: the transportation 
of men and weapons to the battlefield, the transportation 
of men and weapons on the battlefield and the transportation 
of supplies. A description of interaction among contenders 
both within and outside the official policy-making apparatus 
and the influences of the broad categories of attitudes 
to motorization previously identified explains the British 
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Army's failure to concentrate on establishing a modern 
armoured force while the opportunity was still within reach. 
The higher direction of the Army embodied the resistance 
of a conservative military 'Establishment' to the theory 
of armoured warfare held by the innovators. Dominant 
personalities in the War Office argued that reform and 
reorganization directed toward the creation of a motorized 
Army rather than of an armoured force was what was required. 
It was desirable therefore, that the mobility of every 
arm of service be improved through general motorization 
and by a limited mechanization, rather than to focus the 
application of automotive technology on establishing a 
mechanized, armoured force composed almost entirely of 
armaured fighting vehicles as the innovators wished. Thus, 
the British Army motorized to improve infantry mobility, 
to bring artillery into action closer to the centre of 
the battle, and to improve logistial efficiency. Finally, 
how contenders viewed developments was considered to 
evaluate what actually happened in the perspective of those 
who were actually involved. This is worthwhile because, 
if decisions are examined from this perspective, they can 
assume a degree of logic which perhaps they lack in 
retrospect. The facts of what actually happened, judged 
by the concepts of the champions of armoured war, tell 
a sorry tale even though the first British armoured 
divisions of the late 1~30s were heavily tank-orientated. 
However, contenders who adhered to an attrition strategy 
were able to take a considerably more sanguine view of 
developments. Though this may have been ill-founded because 
of a failure to perceive that the army might need not only 
mobility but also the particular combination of mobility 
and striking power associated with armoured forces capable 
of deep strategic penetration, it can be concluded that 
the capability of moving by vehicle gave the British 
infantry battalion of 1939-40 a workable capacity for 
mobility which was to have significant operational strategic 
effects in the hands of certain commanders. 
The next step in the research was to assess the 
relevance of Montgomery's and O'Connor's earlier military 
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experiences for the leadership strengths, particularly 
the command skills and operational strategic insights, 
which they would demonstrate in 1940. In the First World 
war both had experienced the tendency of the growth of 
the mass armies of the late 19th and early 20th centuries 
to make personal leadership by generals increasingly 
difficult. This, they, believed, had negatively affected 
the British Army's efficiency in the First World War. 
Further, they believed that this absence of forward presence 
by senior commanders had produced a military situation 
in whi~h command and control had tended to become separated~ 
Montgomery's and O'Connor's 'principles of war' were not 
radical, revolutionary or unorthodox. They were rooted 
in the experience of the British Army, expressed in Field 
Service Regulations, as to what was considered essential 
to success in war. Their styles of leadership and command, 
however, were direct, personal and limited-heroic for the 
purposes of reintegrating command with control and of 
establishing a common bond with their troops. 
An available technology of warfare is most effective 
when employed by commanders who understand its strengths 
and limitations. Chapter 5 was a substantial development 
of the theme of how O'Connor's and Montgomery's initiative 
and thoughtful use of the second order armaments at their 
disposal resulted in one case in the destruction of a major 
Axis force and in the other in the deliverance of 
significant British forces from equally sure destruction. 
The two strokes of intelligent operational art described 
in this chapter permitted the two commanders not only to 
maximize the effectiveness of scarce armoured and 
semi-armoured assets but to bring to an adequate level 
of efficiency in mobile operations motorized infantry as 
the nucleus of a mixed force in the absence of a viable 
armoured force. Both the applications of motorization 
described in this chapter demonstrate that it is possible 
for a commander to use mainly second order technology to 
achieve the capacity for success in operations against 
an enemy which has seemingly decisive technological 
advantages. Both, in other words, provided evidence that 
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satisfied the demands of the hypothesis for this study 
and satisfied the requirements of subproblem one. 
In operations conducted according to manoeuvre 
principles results can be achieved disproportionate to 
the effort of force employed, provided only that such force 
is employed to best effect. The analysis in Chapter 6 
of Montgomery's and O'Connor's conduct of these operations 
suggest that an explanation of the manner in which they 
gained their advantages is that each was able to find a 
workable strategy to apply their limited offensive strength 
to best effect, through manoeuvre, using their transport 
and communications to achieve the required mobility and 
operational strategic flexibility. This addressed the 
requirements of subproblem two. 
In the hands of progressive commanders the motorization 
of the British Army to 1940 gave the British 1937-43 type 
of infantry battalion the capability to move rapidly over 
great ranges to achieve operational strategic advantage. 
But this was not armoured mobility. Apart from the lightly 
armoured 'Bren carrier', which had been designed as a 
weapons carrier, not a personnel carrier, British infantry 
had no protection or firepower when mounted. At the heart 
of this problem lay the vulnerability of men in unarmoured 
vehicles to all forms of fire. As the British armoured 
division moved away from tank-heaviness towards a balance 
of fewer tanks and more motorized infantry, the lorried 
infantry, or Motor Brigade ensued. These were based on 
standard battalions, carried in a new type of vehicle -
soft-skinned and not armoured. The troop-carrying vehicle 
(T.C.V.) - usually a Bedford 3-ton QL with troop-carrying 
body - was a large lorry fitted with seats, capable of 
carrying a platoon of infantry, 36 men, almost anywhere 
that a tank could go. This was a contrast to the concept 
of mechanized infantry in their own bullet-proof cross-
country vehicles. The lack of a really suitable vehicle 
in which the infantry could move to where they had to attack 
the enemy on their feet (and which could provide suppressive 
fire while the infantry dismounted to continue the assault 
on foot) was perhaps the most significant failure of the 
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British Army to respond to the operational strategic and 
tactical challenges set up by the creation of a mechanized 
army in place of an armoured force. That is, it was a 
failure to provide safe transportation of men and weapons 
to and over the fire-swept battlefield. This problem was 
only partly rectified with the gradual availability of 
the American 'M' series of armoured half-tracks (several 
models of which could be fitted with a ring-mounted machine 
gun above the cab). It was noted in Chapter 2 that O'Connor 
was responsible for one of the most important occasions 
in the Second World War when the British Army improvised 
armoured personnel carriers on tank hulls to deal with 
a tactical situation. Before Operation ~Goodwood' (July 
1944) began he had anticipated the need for the infantry 
to keep up with the tanks and at the same time be protected 
from enemy fire which made movement by lorry unsatisfactory. 
This shows that, of the two principal actors in this 
dissertation, it was O'Connor who came to more clearly 
realise the limitations of motorized infantry on the later 
battlefields of the Second World War. In 1944, when 
O'Connor was trying to get self-propelled gun-carriers 
turned over to the infantry for use as armoured personnel 
carriers, Montgomery was planning Operation 'Market Garden', 
in which the mounts would be jeeps and gliders. 
What emerges from this study? Ultimately, it is not 
claimed the research has conclusively proved an hypothesis 
which was chosen more for the purposes of guiding research 
than to be falsified or proven~ War is too much of a human 
activity to arrive at distinctly final conclusions about 
its conduct. 
The research has shown that advantage in warfare does 
not merely rely on numbers or on superior or inferior 
armaments. The two cases described have indicated that 
success in warfare, whether the achievement of victory 
or the avoidance of defeat, may have to rely as much -
if not more - on the personalities of the commanders. 
For it still requires thought to apply advanced equipment. 
Even the highly armoured and mechanized Panzerwaffe of 
the German Wehrmacht was initially at a disadvantage not 
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only because there were more tanks available in the 
Anglo-French forces in 1940 but also because not all of 
their generals had the insight possessed by such as 
Guderian, Manstein or Rommel. It also took the Manstein 
conception of the 'Sichelschnitt' manoeuvre and the 
initiative and drive of generals such as Rommel to give 
the Wehrmacht the edge. 
The two cases described involved two kindred 
personalities who through enduring similar experiences 
of w~r were able to understand the need for avoiding simple 
adherence to prescribed military practice in favour of 
a thoughtful approach. Montgomery and O'Connor were 
dedicated to being true professionals in spirit as well 
as in name, who devoted themselves to self-development, 
to gaining insight into their experiences and by studying 
the theory and practice of war. They accordingly grew 
to become mature modernizing commanders whose imaginative 
approaches enabled them to respond to the disadvantages 
imposed upon the British Army by post-war economic 
depression, by the pacifist mood of the British public 
and politicians and the conservatism and resultant 
incapacity of the higher echelons of British Army command. 
Thus they were able to take advantage of what they had 
- simple motorization - and to adapt it away from 
stereotyped concepts of logistical employment which they 
replaced with beneficial operational strategic utilization. 
Their characters would probably have developed in the same 
way had they commanded forces fully modernized, armoured 
and mechanized. The simple conclus~on may thus be that, 
while a variety of technologies are important in the waging 
of war so are the personalities of commanders, therefore 
technological superiority or inferiority alone do not make 
the outcome of war inevitable. 
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